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Abstract
In today’s highly interconnected and technology reliant environment, systems
security is rapidly growing in importance to complex systems such as automobiles,
airplanes, and defense-oriented weapon systems. While systems security analysis
approaches are critical to improving the security of these advanced cyber-physical
systems-of-systems, such approaches are often poorly understood and applied in ad hoc
fashion. To address these gaps, first a study of key architectural analysis concepts and
definitions is provided with an assessment of their applicability towards complex cyberphysical systems. From this initial work, a definition of cybersecurity architectural
analysis for cyber-physical systems is proposed. Next, the System Theory Theoretic
Process Analysis approach for Security (STPA-Sec) is tailored and presented in three
phases which support the development of conceptual-level security requirements,
applicable design-level criteria, and architectural-level security specifications in
alignment with the systems engineering standard ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288 and the newly
released NIST SP 800-160 Systems Security Engineering publication.
This work uniquely presents a detailed case study of a conceptual-level systems
security analysis of a notional aerial refueling system based on the tailored STPA-Sec
approach. This case study provides a detailed security analysis with emphasis on how to
conduct STPA-Sec early in the development process to more accurately elicit,
understand, and define security requirements in three levels of increasing detail: 1. Initial
security requirements are systematically elicited; 2. Design for security requirements are
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identified; and 3. Build-to security specifications are formally defined. This work is
critically important for advancing the science of systems security engineering by
providing a standardized approach for understanding security, safety, and resiliency
requirements in complex systems with traceability and testability.
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CONCEPTUAL SYSTEMS SECURITY ANALYSIS AERIAL REFUELING
CASE STUDY

I. INTRODUCTION
General Issue
In today’s highly interconnected and technology reliant environment, systems
security is rapidly growing in importance. As the Internet of Things continues to grow,
the centrality of cyber-physical devices to modern life is increasingly important. Thus,
security (and safety) is now an emergent property of cyber-physical systems, where their
software and real-time networks require continuous interaction [1]. For example, the
2017 Ford F-150, a fairly common vehicle, has over 150 million lines of code distributed
across dozens of computing devices with software providing essential functionality [2],
[3]. Moreover, intelligent adversaries are challenging traditional assumptions that cyberphysical systems are secure due to their relative isolation and uniqueness with recent
examples including the widely publicized hacking demonstration against a Jeep Cherokee
[4], claims of hacking a commercial airliner [5], and comprehensive reports of vehicular
attack paths [6].
In light of these growing threats, the United States Department of Defense (U. S.
DoD) has made recent changes to expand traditional IT-focused security approaches and
mandate security assessments for major weapon systems (MWS) [7], [8], [9], [10], [11],
[12]. These policies dictate that acquisition programs integrate security efforts into
existing systems engineering processes, and work to ensure security considerations hold
equal footing with other requirements and design trade-offs at major program reviews.
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Although, these DoD mandates are in place, a well-received streamlined executable
approach for MWS cybersecurity analysis is yet to be defined. This research explores
these problems and presents a case study of interest to the USAF.
Problem Statement
While systems security analysis approaches are critical to improving the security
of complex systems-of-systems, such approaches are often poorly understood and applied
in ad hoc fashion. Across the defense industry, the DoD, and the Air Force program
offices have differing approaches to this problem. Most of the system security approaches
surveyed are focused on realized systems with limited solution space as they begin
analysis at the physical system solution where the cost to design for security and
resiliency is greatly increased. Moreover, the lack of measurable and verifiable security
and resiliency requirements in early, pre physical form, system design has plagued the
development of complex weapons systems often leaving mission owners with little
choice between restricted functionality and expensive bolt on security features, often at
the detriment of mission effectiveness.
Research Context
Emphasizing the importance of this problem, the US Congress included a
mandate and provided significant funding in the National Defense Authorization Act of
2016 Section 1647 [8] to assess all of major weapons systems across all services for
cyber vulnerabilities. In response, the Air Force stood up the Cyber Resiliency Office for
Weapons Systems (CROWS) to develop and execute the Air Force Cyber Campaign
Plan’s (CCP) two overall goals: ‘Bake In’ cyber resiliency to new weapons systems, and,
2

in line with the congressional mandate, mitigate ‘critical’ vulnerabilities in fielded
systems [13]. The CROWS office has emphasized the importance of integrating cyber
into systems engineering through training of a cyber savvy acquisition force.
Cybersecurity for weapons systems in no longer a task just for the IT professional, but
should be integrated in systems engineering efforts. It must be specified in early
requirements to be included in the design trades with all other mission needs. In light of
the growing cybersecurity threat, a clear necessity has emerged for a streamlined
executable early systems based approach.
This work directly contributes to the CROWS and CCP Line of Action 3‘Train
Cyber Workforce’ by providing a case study example of a conceptual security analysis to
elicit security requirements for future major weapons systems.
Investigative Questions
1. What is Cybersecurity Architectural Analysis?
2. What methods exist for conducting Cybersecurity Architectural Analysis?
3. What are the key characteristics for Cybersecurity Architectural Analysis and how
do they map to current approaches for complex cyber-physical systems?
4. How can STPA-Sec be tailored to enable the development of security
requirements and design criteria?
5. How executable is STPA-Sec for USAF warfighting Systems?
6. What recommendations can be made to increase the utility and ease the use of
STPA-Sec?

3

Methodology
This research effort is conducted in two parts: First, this work surveys multiple
approaches used to perform complex system security analysis (i. e. , cybersecurity
architectural analysis) with specific focus to those relevant to the DoD and complex
weapon systems. This research informs tailored definitions and desirable characteristics
for conducting systems security. From this survey, STPA-Sec was chosen for further
study and experimentation.
Second, we conduct a case study offering a complete and thorough example of
STPA-Sec on a notional next generation aerial refueling platform. STPA-Sec is a
promising approach for performing conceptual systems security analysis based on a
methodology of systems theory dating back to Leveson’s original systems safety STAMP
work which has been well received within the safety, aeronautical, and systems
engineering communities [14], [15]. STPA-Sec is an extension of her methodology to the
security domain and has been shown to effectively address security issues in complex
cyber-physical systems [16]. This case study evaluates STPA-Sec’s utility to perform
conceptual systems security analysis for United States Department of Defense Major
Weapon Systems.
Assumptions/Limitations/Scope
To maximize the audience of this document, this thesis excludes sensitive or
classified sources and information. The scope of this research effort is limited to system
security approaches with publically available and citable documentation to enable the
broadest distribution. Conclusions drawn on the effectiveness of the surveyed methods
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are limited to SME inputs and author discretion as completion of a case study with each
approach for direct comparison is beyond the scope of this research effort and would in
fact take years to complete with little value. Mission specific details have been
obfuscated and generalized for widest distribution.
The Way Ahead
With the progressive nature of the research questions, this thesis will follow a
scholarly, or k-paper, format. In Chapter II, the publication “Cybersecurity Architectural
Analysis for Complex Cyber-Physical Systems” provides an extended background and
literature review for this thesis. Of note, the work details key terms for systems security
and surveys several architectural analysis approaches from government and industry.
Moreover, it suggests a working definition of Cybersecurity Architectural Analysis, and
identifies desirable characteristics for effective architectural analysis.
In Chapter III, the publication “A Systems Security Analysis Approach for
Understanding, Defining, and Specifying Security Requirements for Complex CyberPhysical Systems” introduces a tailored approach for STPA-Sec, a promising
methodology for conceptual systems security analysis. In addition, an abbreviated case
study for a space vehicle is presented to provide insight into the processes and benefits of
an STPA-Sec analysis.
In Chapter IV, the journal publication “Conceptual Systems Security Analysis
with Aerial Refueling Case Study” provides a detailed overview of the methodology and
data used for the case study portion of this thesis. A tailored approach of STPA-Sec is
presented building upon the foundation from Chapter III and expanded with additional
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insight and recommendations for execution of STPA-Sec for a complex cyber-physical
system. This is presented as a case study for a next generation aerial refueling platform.
Chapter V summarizes research questions with an emphasis on impact to the
DoD, presents conclusions, and identifies future work.
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II. Literature Review
Description:
Chapter II is a self-contained conference paper that provides an extended
background and literature review. It provides key terms and concepts in support of
familiarizing the System Engineer with systems security analysis for complex system
cybersecurity.
This work answers research question 1 of the thesis providing a definition for
Cyber Architectural Analysis. It fulfills question 2 through surveying existing
architectural analysis approaches, and answers question 3 by identifying key
characteristics and providing a mapping of utility for the practitioner.
Publication Details:
Title: Cybersecurity Architectural Analysis for Complex Cyber-Physical Systems
Publication: Submitted to Cyber Defense Review(CDR) journal
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Cybersecurity Architectural Analysis for
Complex Cyber-Physical Systems
Martin “Trae” Span, Logan O. Mailloux, Michael R. Grimaila
Air Force Institute of Technology
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio
Abstract—In the modern military’s highly interconnected and
technology-reliant operational environment, cybersecurity is
rapidly growing in importance. Moreover, cybersecurity is no
longer limited to traditional computer systems and IT networks,
as a number of highly publicized attacks have occurred against
complex cyber-physical systems such as automobiles and
airplanes. While architectural analysis approaches are critical to
improving cybersecurity, these approaches are often poorly
understood and applied in ad hoc fashion. This work addresses
these gaps by answering the questions: 1. “What is cybersecurity
architectural analysis?” and 2. “How can architectural analysis
be used to more effectively support cybersecurity decision making
for complex cyber-physical systems?” First, a readily
understandable description of key architectural concepts and
definitions is provided which culminates in a working definition
of “cybersecurity architectural analysis,” since none is available
in the literature. Next, we survey several architectural analysis
approaches to provide the reader of an understanding of the
various approaches being used across government and industry.
Based our proposed definition, the previously introduced key
concepts, and our survey results, we establish desirable
characteristics for evaluating cybersecurity architectural analysis
approaches. Lastly, each of the surveyed approaches is assessed
against the characteristics and areas of future work are identified.
Keywords—cybersecurity; architectural analysis; system
architecture; systems security engineering; complex system security

I. INTRODUCTION
The cybersecurity threat is one of the most serious economic
and national challenges we face as a nation – economic
prosperity in the 21st century depends on cyber [1]. Cyber
attacks have grown in frequency and complexity, and it is now
commonplace to hear of widespread cyber attacks on personal
computers, webservers, and even large company and
government personnel databases [2]. Moreover, as the Internet
of Things (IoT) continues to grow, the centrality of cyberphysical devices to modern life is increasingly important [3].
Previously, cyber-physical systems such as automobiles and
airplanes were relatively simplistic. Astonishingly, the 2017
Ford F-150, a relatively common vehicle, has over 150 million
lines of code [4], demonstrating the complexity of modern
systems when software is at the core of functionality [5]. For
these cyber-enabled systems, adversaries are challenging
traditional assumptions that systems are secure due to their
relative isolation and uniqueness. Recent examples include a
widely publicized hacking demonstration against a Jeep
Cherokee [6], claims of hacking a commercial airliner [7], and
comprehensive reports of vehicle vulnerabilities [8]. In light of
this growing threat, it is critical to analyze modern weapon

systems for cybersecurity vulnerabilities as directed by United
States Congress [9].
Recent United States (U.S.) Department of Defense (DoD)
policy updates have expanded the traditional IT security
approaches and mandated cybersecurity assessments for cyberenabled weapon systems [9], [10], [11], [12]. These revisions
dictate that acquisition programs integrate cybersecurity efforts
into existing systems engineering processes, and work to ensure
cyber considerations hold equal footing with other requirements
and design trade-offs at major acquisition milestones [13].
For highly complex systems, including U.S. DoD weapon
systems, architectural analysis is a critical enabler to effective
cybersecurity; however, architectural analysis approaches are
often poorly understood and applied in ad hoc fashion. This
work addresses these gaps by answering the questions:
1.

“What is cybersecurity architectural analysis?”

2.

“How can architectural analysis be used to more
effectively support cybersecurity decision making for
cyber-physical systems?”

This paper examines and proposes answers to the above
questions. In Section II, we provide a readily understandable
discussion of key concepts and definitions. Section III expands
on this foundation and surveys several cybersecurity
architecture analysis approaches from government and industry.
In Section IV, desirable characteristics for architectural analysis
for cybersecurity are identified and mapped to the approaches
from Section III. Lastly, Section V summarizes key findings
and identifies promising follow-on research areas for increasing
the effectiveness of cybersecurity architectural analysis of
unprecedented systems, specifically modern complex
cyber-physical systems.
II. FOUNDATIONAL CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS
This section provides a brief historical context for systemlevel architectural analysis and, more formally, discusses key
definitions for cybersecurity architectural analysis.
A. Brief History of System Architecture
Much of the seminal work in the field of architecture
analysis was accomplished by Zachman, who proposed the first
system architecture—a logical construct for integrating the
complexities of modern information systems [14]. Similarly to
the varying levels of abstraction in physical construction plans,
Zachman argued that system architectures should be composed
of many perspectives in varying levels of detail. Moreover, he
insisted that these perspectives (or views) be synchronized
across the system, forming one integrated architecture.

Sowa expanded Zachman’s work to form the Information
Systems Architecture (ISA) framework [15]. Shown in Fig. 1,
the ISA employs six interrogatives (what, how, where, who,
when, and why) across five levels of detail (scope, business,
system, technology, and detailed representations) as a means of
expressing relationships to guide complex system development
[16]. In this way, the ISA offers a simplified approach to
compare and elaborate on the desired capabilities, requirements,
components, and functions in an integrated enterprise-level
model which enables effective decision making. Note, not all
30 conceptual graphs are required; thus, the ISA is also
tailorable. Since its inception, the ISA (commonly known as the
Zachman Framework) has been a popular choice for system
architects—it has been widely used by system architects for
decades, while several other system-level frameworks have
incorporated or adopted its tenets [17].
B. Key Definitions
Here we discuss definitions for key terminology used in this
work (i.e., “cybersecurity,” “architecture,” and “analysis”).
First, the term “cybersecurity” should be addressed because it is
generally the most poorly understood (see sidebar in [18]).
Within the U.S. DoD, cybersecurity is formally defined as:
The prevention of damage to, protection of, and restoration
of electronic systems to ensure its availability, integrity,
authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation [19].
Despite being often cited, this definition tends to cause
confusion because it is packed with domain-specific IT jargon:
availability ensures the system is usable as anticipated; integrity
is the protection from unauthorized modification;
confidentiality is keeping data private; authentication is a
validation of the claimed identity; and nonrepudiation is the
ability to prove that an action has taken place. While seemingly
comprehensive, the U.S. DoD definition is somewhat hindered
with legacy terminology; a more practical (i.e., a working)
definition of cybersecurity might simply seek to protect critical
systems against cyber-based threats [20].

The next key term to define is “architecture” (note, we
interpret “architecture” synonymously with “system
architecture” and/or “system-level architecture”). Perhaps the
most classically understood definition of architecture is
provided by Maier and Rechtin:
Structure in terms of components, connections, and
constraints of a product, process, or element [21].
This definition offers a holistic view of the system of interest to
include technological aspects as well as non-technological
aspects, such as processes. In the simplest terms, an architecture
merely provides a means for viewing the system of interest
from different perspectives. Conversely, in a somewhat
physically-driven characterization, ISO/IEC/IEEE 42010
provides the following definition for architecture:
The fundamental organization of a system, embodied in its
components, their relationship to each other and to the
environment, and the principles governing its design and
evolution [22].
Somewhat surprisingly, the U.S. DoD provides a very
progressive definition of system architecture:
A set of abstractions (or models) that simplify and
communicate complex structures, processes, rules, and
constraints to improve understanding and implementation
[23].
In addition to being readily understandable, this definition alerts
the reader to the intrinsic value offered by such architectures in
that they serve to simplify communication with, and improve
understanding of, key stakeholders (not just engineers).
Moreover, this definition implies that architectures are intended
to improve the system’s implementation. While these value-rich
aspects of the definition are a bit atypical, they are useful for
helping others to understand what an architecture is and does.

Fig 1. The Zachman Framework for Enterprise Architecture [24].

Lastly, the task of identifying a formal definition of
“analysis” within the context of a “system architecture” proved
more difficult than previous definitions. Often a systems
architecture will center on an integrated model of entities and
the relationships between them; architectural models serve as a
vehicle to bring order, and thus understandability, to the
growing complexity associated with complex systems. An
architecture-focused definition may read as such
Architectural analysis is the activity of discovering
important system properties using conceptual and physical
models of the system of interest [25].
However, an architecture’s purpose is to increase understanding
and facilitate better engineering choices [17]. This two-fold
purpose is acutely stated by Crawley et al.:
Architectural analysis focuses on understanding both the
architecture’s function and form for the purpose of
supporting decision making [26].
It is worth noting the closely related concept of architecture
trade-off analysis, which focuses on evaluating and comparing
alternative architecture-level designs and attributes (e.g.,
modifiability, security, performance, reliability, etc.) [27].
C. Cybersecurity Architectural Analysis Working Definition
Ultimately, architectural analysis identifies trade-off points
among system attributes and facilitates communication among
stakeholders (e.g., customers, developers, operators,
maintainers). System-level architectural analysis requires
consideration of various missions, essential functions, potential
components, and desirable attributes, which help to clarify and
refine stakeholder needs and, later, requirements. Moreover,
integrated architectural analysis provides a robust framework
for ongoing and concurrent system design and analysis.
Specific to the cyber domain, architectural analysis should
be used to understand cyber dependencies within the functions
and form of the system to enable well-informed decisions. This
type of structured analysis brings an otherwise unmanageable
amount of information under control in support of system
security requirements [28]. Architectural analysis enables
system-level programmatic risk management by providing
context and functional mapping to the various physical
elements of the system. Thus, cybersecurity architectural
analysis allows appropriate security mitigations to be applied
where needed with rigorous justification.
After considering seminal definitions in the area, and
working through the various architectural analysis approaches
discussed in Section III, we present a working definition of
cybersecurity architectural analysis for consideration:
The activity of discovering and evaluating the function and
form of a system to facilitate cybersecurity decisions.
This definition identifies two key activities, discovery and
evaluation, while simultaneously catering to both new
development (i.e., a focus on desired capability through
functionality) and legacy systems (i.e., a focus on existing
system solutions). For new developments, discovery typically
implies exploring the business or mission problem space to

further understand the desired capability through functional
analysis. For existing systems, this process is often conducted
in the reverse, mapping critical subsystems back to critical
functions which support important business operations or
mission execution. It is also worth noting that cybersecurity
architectural analysis should also help with identifying and
understanding how security requirements support the desired
capability, which also provides traceability that is often lacking
in systems security efforts.
As part of the broader system definition and development
effort, cybersecurity architectural analysis should help inform
engineering tradeoffs and decision making such as those
processes and activities described in ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288.
III. CURRENT CYBERSECURITY
ARCHITECTURAL ANALYSIS APPROACHES
In this section, we survey architectural analysis approaches
and assess their applicability for complex system cybersecurity.
Within the U.S. DoD (and its major defense contractors),
several approaches (i.e., methods, processes, and tools) have
been developed to secure and assess the cybersecurity of
complex systems and systems-of-systems. While providing a
detailed case study for each approach surveyed in this work
would be ideal for a robust assessment, it is simply not feasible
as some approaches take months if not years to complete. This
survey is based on publicly available literature and
presentations that focus specifically on architectural analysis for
weapon systems.
The predecessor for many cybersecurity architectural
analysis approaches is compliance-based Information
Assurance (IA), which focuses almost exclusively on applying
security controls to computer networks and IT systems. For
complex systems this approach is inadequate as demonstrated
by several high profile security breaches [29]. This inadequacy
has driven the development of many of the approaches
described in this work.
A. Department of Defense Architectural Framework (DoDAF)
The integrated architecture currently in use by the U.S. DoD
is the DoD Architecture Framework (DoDAF). Its purpose is to
manage complexity to enable key decisions through organized
information sharing [23]. However, in DoDAF, like many other
architecture frameworks, security (or cybersecurity) is not
specifically addressed [30]. James Richards, in his work Using
the Department of Defense Architecture Framework to Develop
Security Requirements [28], proposes a methodology for using
DoDAF to derive security requirements. He outlines a process
of first building an architectural model of the enterprise,
focusing on a core set of views including the OV-5b operational
activity model, the DIV-2 logical data model, and the OV-3
operational resource flow matrix. These critical views are used
to model security-relevant processes, data, business rules, and
communications. Next, he suggests comparing views for
compliance and then assessing and refining the architecture.
The overall purpose of Richards’ approach is to use DoDAF to
expose or derive security requirements [28]. This approach has
not been widely adopted but his work demonstrates utility for
complex cyber-physical systems.

B. Unified Architecture Framework (UAF)
In contrast to the U.S. DoD unique solution DoDAF,
industry has developed the Unified Architecture Framework
(UAF) [31]. Based on industry need, the UAF includes a formal
security domain amongst the more common architectural views.
The UAF security domain includes views for security
taxonomy, structure, connectivity, processes, constraints, and
traceability. More specifically, it uses SysML class diagrams to
identify data types and map them to protections and security
controls. As an integrated architecture, it allows securityrelevant elements to be mapped to system resources and
operations. UAF also capitalizes on the success of MBSE
efforts to depict and analyze the security properties of a SoI via
an executable architecture. Note, UAF is in the final stages of
development, so its utility has yet to be fully realized; however,
the some pathfinder examples of proposed security views
demonstrate utility for conducting cybersecurity architectural
analysis of complex cyber-physical systems [32].
C. Publically Avilable Industry Efforts
Major defense contractors often use custom architectural
analysis approaches to design and evaluate their system
architectures with respect to cybersecurity. Although it is likely
that most large U.S. DoD contractors are working solutions in
this area; at the time of this survey, the authors were only
exposed to efforts from Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, and
Lockheed Martin. Note, Raytheon’s Cyber Resiliency
Architecture Framework (CRAF) was the only approach with a
detailed open source publication available. Limited information
is available on Northrop and Lockheed’s approaches.
Raytheon developed CRAF using a DoDAF reference
architecture with extensions for specific cyber resilience
mappings and metrics [33]. The goal of CRAF is to assess and
identify gaps in cyber resiliency by mapping systems,
subsystems, and components against prioritized capabilities to
identify resilience requirements for important mission
scenarios.
Using failure modes and effects analysis, Northrop
Grumman created a risk-based assessment methodology using
an integrated architecture modeled in the new UAF to identify
cyber risks for their systems [32]. This approach is still under
development and is one of the first systems security efforts
based on the upcoming UAF standard security views from the
Object Management Group (OMG).
Lockheed Martin has created a custom solution titled the
Secure Engineering Assurance Model (SEAM) [34]. SEAM is a
tailored systems security engineering approach to integrate
security into every solution they deliver. This framework
provides tailored security considerations and checklists for each
program area.
D. Risk Management Framework (RMF) for Cybersecurity
In response to increasing risks against critical infrastructure
and information technology systems, the US government
enacted the Federal Information Security Management Act of
2002 which established minimum information security
requirements for federal information systems, and charged the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) with
developing security standards and guidelines to address these

growing risks [35]. In response to this requirement, NIST
created the Risk Management Framework (RMF) which
provided a structured yet flexible process for applying these
standards and guidelines [36]. Accordingly, RMF is the
mandated approach for addressing cybersecurity in the U.S.
DoD [11]. In general, this approach applies a prescriptive riskbased methodology to cybersecurity with the goal of
identifying, mitigating, and eliminating system vulnerabilities
to protect systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure,
disruption, modification, or destruction. Within the United
States Air Force, the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center
is tasked with conducting RMF for legacy weapon systems
(designated as the Platform IT (PIT) systems) [37]. This PIT
assessment and authorization process consists of six steps
described in the next paragraph [13].
First, the team must categorize the PIT system according to
the information displayed, processed, stored, and transmitted
along with the classification of the information and associated
technologies. Second, security controls are selected (or
assigned) based on the impact resulting from the loss of said
information (i.e., criticality analysis) [12]. The third step is
implementing said controls with consideration for cybersecurity
requirements across the entire system development life cycle—
although security controls have been historically applied to IT
systems, many have been tailored for PIT systems with
prescribed overlays [37]. The fourth step is key to the RMF
process and assesses the effectiveness of applied security
controls through threat mapping and vulnerability analysis. On
a related note, much of the security work conducted today is
exclusively focused on this step. Based on the identified
vulnerabilities, the fifth step is to produce a risk assessment and
mitigation plan, which is then briefed to the Authorization
Official for authorization. The sixth step of the RMF process is
continuous monitoring of the system with respect to
cybersecurity. As the system and threat environment evolve
over time, security control effectiveness needs to be
continuously assessed while keeping in mind future changes
and cybersecurity impact.
The RMF is the mostly widely implement approach of those
surveyed as it is mandatory for DoD information systems to
receive an authorization to operate. While this approach has
mitigated vulnerabilities, many site its perceived difficulty,
steep learning curve, and IT centric focus as currently
implemented as critiques in its utility for complex cyberphysical systems.
E. Avionics Cyberspace Vulnerability Assessment and
Mitigation (ACVAM) and Cyber Hardening Efforts
The United States Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL),
in conjunction with the Air Force Institute of Technology’s
Center for Cyberspace Research, developed an Avionics
Cyberspace Vulnerability Assessment and Mitigation
(ACVAM) Workshop [38]. This weapon-system-specific
workshop teaches a thorough analysis approach by
systematically identifying and assessing all external inputs and
communications paths to and from a weapon system (i.e., an
exhaustive boundary analysis of the system’s architecture). The
major activities include gathering information, identifying and
analyzing access points, finding and analyzing susceptibilities,

anticipating attacks, and applying and recommending
mitigations and protections. The ACVAM approach requires
extensive Subject Matter Expert (SME) involvement, access to
design documents, and detailed operator insight to discover
susceptibilities and determine appropriate mitigations to
increase mission assurance by eliminating or reducing
vulnerability to cyberattacks [39].
Additionally, AFRL is developing more specific cyber
hardening tools and resiliency instructions [40]. While specific
details are not publicly available, the cyber hardening approach
was recently briefed to the defense community at large [39]. In
general, this approach describes avionics cyber hardening and
resiliency concepts and suggests ways to protect avionics and
related systems from cyber-attack. Moreover, this approach
encourages engineers to ‘think avionics cyber’ using three
tenets of cyber protection: focus on what’s critical; restrict
access to the critical; and detect, react, and adapt [41]. These
approaches provide a robust analysis but require technically
savvy domain experts to execute, which restricts its utility for a
larger group of complex systems.
F. Attack Path Analysis via Automotive Example
Historically, attack path analysis has served the security
community well [42]. In a great example from the automotive
domain, Checkoway et al. provide a practical attack path
analysis and comprehensive discussion which solidifies the
importance of threat modeling as a cybersecurity architectural
analysis technique [8]. While this specific example is
automobile centric, many similarities are shared between cyberphysical systems. More specifically, the work details a fourstep method of analyses. First, threat model characterization is
accomplished through identification of external attack vectors
and attack surfaces. Second, vulnerability analysis addresses the
accessibility, criticality, and exploitability of potential
vulnerabilities. Third, a threat assessment attempts to gauge the
attacker’s motivation by answering the question of what utility
a given attack path has for the attacker. Finally, the approach
suggests mitigation actions by synthesizing similarities among
vulnerabilities to provide pragmatic recommendations for
enhancing the system’s cybersecurity.
G. System Theory Process Analysis for Security (STPA-Sec)
In recent work, MIT’s System Theory Process Analysis
(STPA) approach for safety was extended to focus on
security-related concerns, known as STPA-Sec [43]. The goal
of this approach is to ensure mission-critical functions are
maintained in the face of disruption(s). Starting from a strategic
viewpoint, system developers and users can proactively shape
the operational environment by controlling specified mission
critical system risks. This top-down approach elevates the
security problem from guarding the system (or network) against
all potential attack paths to a higher-level problem of assuring
the system’s critical functions. The STPA-Sec steps include:
identifying unacceptable losses, identifying system hazards
(vulnerabilities), drawing the system functional control
structure, and identifying unsafe or insecure CAs [43]. This
method has been embraced by defense and commercial
industries with several favorable case studies [44].

H. Functional Mission Analysis for Cyber (FMA-C)
The DoD has adopted Functional Mission Analysis for
Cyber (FMA-C) as an approach to secure operational computer
networks [45]. FMA-C is being taught to thousands of airmen
in an effort to assure critical cyber systems and reduce
vulnerabilities. While the structure and content of FMA-C is
similar to STPA-Sec, its application is tailored to As-Is
Information Technology infrastructures. In practice, USAF
Mission Defense Teams apply FMA-C to fielded cyber
systems to identify mission critical vulnerabilities. It has
proved to be a useful tool for understanding and mitigating
risks in traditional cyber (i.e. ICT) domains.
I. Other Notable Methodologies
As previously noted, other methodologies and frameworks
for systems-level security analysis are sure to exist which are
not covered in this work. A few notable works focused on
mission assurance are available here [46], [47], [48] and on
software here [49], [50].
IV. DESIRABLE CHARACTERISTICS FOR
CONDUCTING CYBERSECURITY ARCHITECTURAL ANALYSIS
This section identifies desirable characteristics for
cybersecurity architectural analysis and cross-examines the
approaches discussed in Section III.
A. Cybersecurity Architectural Analysis Characteristics
The first characteristic is definitional in nature and classifies
approaches as either top-down or bottom-up. Those defined as
top-down start with analysis at the function level with
identification and examination of critical missions and/or
capabilities—sometimes operations depending on how the
approach is being applied. As is typical of architecting for new
systems (and sometimes upgrades), higher-level functional
analysis leads to further functional decomposition and
allocation to a more specific form (e.g., lower subsystems,
elements, or components). These approaches lend themselves to
the identification of stakeholder security needs, early trade-offs,
thorough security requirements definition, and integration of
more holistic security solutions [27].
Conversely, bottom-up approaches begin with the form in
mind (i.e., the physical or technological solution) and often
focus on perimeter security through boundary analysis [51].
While this approach successfully identifies vulnerabilities in
networked components, it is often less useful for protecting
systems from intelligent adversaries. For example, Bayuk and
Horowitz [52] surmise that perimeter defense tactics are largely
ineffective, and conclude that a top-down, risk-based systems
engineering approach to system security should be used instead.
The next key characteristic is whether the approach should
be driven by threats or vulnerabilities. Prior research suggests
that the foundation for improving system security starts with an
analysis of potential threats, which leads to more appropriate
security requirements for implementation [42]. This is intuitive;
without first understanding the adversary—system-specific
threats (and their rapid agility)—it is difficult, or impossible, to
defend against them. Understanding and modeling the threat
becomes a critical prerequisite for generating and developing
secure systems [53]. Once the model has been developed and

validated, vulnerability analysis is the logical follow-on. With
the threats understood, the system architecture can be analyzed
for vulnerable access points through techniques such as attack
path analysis and/or red teaming.
While acknowledging the rapidly changing nature of
threats, the exercise of red teaming and brainstorming potential
attack paths is a helpful critical thinking exercise for ensuring
sound cybersecurity practices. Moreover, threat modeling and
vulnerability analysis typically form the foundation for
cybersecurity architectural analysis. While threat modeling
alone does not ensure cybersecurity, rigorous threat modeling
and vulnerability analysis are helpful for ensuring the security
of realized systems. However, more focus should be applied to
providing security solutions and not just focused on identifying
problems.
In today’s highly contested cyberspace environment,
documentation-based engineering is largely ineffective against
dynamic adversaries [42]. Developing a successful response to
a dynamic adversary necessitates the tools and methods used to
develop countermeasures be, in kind, dynamic. In response to
these complexities, Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE)
offers an integrated modeling approach capable of mapping
desired capabilities to functions (and even components), as well
as providing traceability and fit-for-purpose views to enable
more effective decision-making [54]. In a recent effort, Apvrille
and Roudier proposed SysML-Sec, an injection of security
considerations into SysML in an effort to foster integration
between system designers and security experts [55]. SysMLSec and more generally MBSE approaches enable securityfocused computer simulations of a potential system
architecture. These executable architectures provide
tremendous value by providing insights into early design tradeoff analysis [56]. While MBSE requires significant initial
investment in tools and training, it significantly increases the
depth of possible architectural analysis especially in executable
architectures.
B. Assesment of Architectural Analysis Approaches
Table I provides a consolidated assessment (i.e., a mapping)
of the proposed architectural analysis characteristics to the
surveyed approaches from Section III. This mapping seeks to
provide a consolidated reference for differentiating approaches
to inform the user and assist in selecting an appropriate
cybersecurity architectural approach which meets the
stakeholders’ needs. Consideration is given to each approaches’
usability, scalability, and tool availability. The ideal approach
will also easily facilitate modeling and simulation studies to
perform early design feasibility studies and support trade-off
analysis (i.e., MBSE).
In general, bottom-up approaches are relatively systematic;
however, historically they have not produced secure systems
and tend to scale poorly. Top-down approaches have the benefit
of being more scalable, but they often require a high level of
tool proficiency to effectively model (thus, the potential of
MBSE to systems security is largely missed). While
vulnerability analysis is inherent in every approach, a threatbased approach is less so. This aspect is important because
effectively safeguarding unprecedented, complex systems
requires more than a good architectural tool or technique – a

holistic engineering approach that embraces all aspects of
security (e.g., people, processes, policy, technology, feasibility,
cost, etc.) is required [57], [58].
TABLE I: ARCHITECTURAL APPROACHES TO CHARACTERISTICS MAPPING.
Top Bottom Threat Vul.
MBSE
MBSE
Tool
Down Up
Driven Based Integrated Executable Based
DoDAF +
X1
X
X
X4
X
Richards
1
X
X
X
X
X
X
CRAF
UAF
4
X
X
X
X
X
Security
X
X
X
ACVAM
X
STPA-Sec X2
X5
X
X
X3
RMF
1. Promotes a top-down approach after mission functions are identified (i.e.,
does not include mission thread analysis).
2. Approach begins at a higher level than other approaches examined (i.e.,
includes mission thread analysis) and includes lower level analysis.
3. Suggests using MBSE, but not required and often not considered.
4. Would require pairing with additional modeling & simulation plugin.
5. RMF is intended to be a top-down approach but is often applied bottom-up
using security control compliance based on system type.

V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The practice of architectural analysis is not new; however,
in the context of complex cyber-physical systems, the role of
architectural analysis with respect to cybersecurity is not well
understood. Moreover, given cybersecurity’s widespread
interest, it was surprising to find a general lack of
understanding or consistency regarding what it means to
conduct architectural analysis for cybersecurity while surveying
the literature. Thus, this work briefly surveys key architectural
analysis concepts and provides a timely and widely applicable
working definition of “cybersecurity architectural analysis” for
the community to consider. Next, a survey of several
cybersecurity architectural analysis approaches from industry
and government is provided, along with an assessment of their
applicability for complex cyber-physical systems according to
several desirable characteristics. These results help practitioners
and researchers understand how to achieve more effective
cybersecurity architectural analysis efforts in order to develop
secure systems according to stakeholders needs.
While there are several promising cybersecurity
architectural approaches, each with unique aspects to be more
fully explored, standardized approaches such as UAF paired
with MBSE hold promise and have a wider acceptance than
some alternatives. In the near term, the authors have chosen to
explore STPA-Sec to more fully understand its utility as a
relatively simple architectural analysis approach to assist in the
development of safe, secure, and resiliency military systems.
Specifically, the authors are executing a detailed case study for
a next-generation aircraft refueling system. This case study
focuses on understanding the utility of the STPA-Sec approach
for eliciting cybersecurity and resiliency requirements when
developing complex military systems (i.e., unprecedented
cyber-physical systems of systems). Ultimately, continued
research in this field will enable more effective and efficient
cybersecurity architectural analysis for complex systems
regardless of application domain.
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Abstract—In today’s highly interconnected and technology
reliant environment, systems security is rapidly growing in
importance. Moreover, security is no longer limited to traditional
computer systems and IT networks, as a number of highly
publicized attacks have occurred against complex cyber-physical
systems such as automobiles and airplanes. While systems security
analysis approaches are critical to improving the security of these
systems-of-systems, such approaches are often poorly understood
and applied in ad hoc fashion. This work addresses such gaps by
detailing a relatively straight forward security analysis approach
for understanding, defining, and specifying security requirements.
First, a readily understandable description of key architectural
analysis concepts and definitions is provided along with an
assessment of their applicability to complex cyber-physical
systems. Next, a variant of the System Theory Process Analysis
approach for Security (STPA-Sec) is detailed in three phases
which support development of functional-level security
requirements, applicable design-level criteria, and architecturallevel security specifications in alignment with the stated systems
and software engineering processes in ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288 and
the recently released NIST SP 800-160. This work is important for
advancing the science of systems security engineering by
providing a viable systems security analysis approach for eliciting
and capturing traceable security, safety, and resiliency
requirements and criteria that can be designed-for, built-to, and
formally verified.
Keywords—security; systems security
architecture; systems security engineering

analysis;

system

I. INTRODUCTION
The cybersecurity threat is one of the most serious
challenges in the 21st century. Over the past decade, attacks
against Information and Communication Technologies (ICT)
have grown considerably in frequency and complexity, and it is
now commonplace to hear of widespread attacks against
personal computers, webservers and services, Internet of Things
(IoT) devices, and even critical government databases.
Moreover, the security of cyber-physical devices is becoming
increasingly important as these devices take on central roles in
nearly every aspect of modern life. Previously, cyber-physical
systems such as automobiles and airplanes were complicated,
but not interactively complex. Security (and safety) is now an
emergent properly of cyber-physical systems, where their
software and real-time networks require previously isolated
components to continuously interact [1]. For example, the 2017
Ford F-150, a fairly common vehicle in the United States, has
over 150 million lines of code distributed across dozens of
computing devices with software providing its essential
functionality [2], [3]. Moreover, adversaries are challenging

traditional assumptions that cyber-physical systems are secure
due to their relative isolation and uniqueness with recent
examples including the widely publicized hacking
demonstration against a Jeep Cherokee [4], claims of hacking a
commercial airliner [5], and comprehensive reports of vehicular
attack paths [6].
In light of these growing threats, it is critical for security
professionals to have appropriate tools and techniques for
performing systems security engineering and analysis. For
example, the United States Department of Defense (U.S. DoD)
which historically values systems security, has made several
recent changes to expand traditional IT-focused security
approaches and mandate security assessments for cyberphysical weapon systems [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12]. These
policies dictate that acquisition programs integrate security
efforts into existing systems engineering processes, and work to
ensure security considerations hold equal footing with other
requirements and design trade-offs at major program reviews.
However, it is not easy to understand what constitutes a
“secure” system, nor how to specify effective security criteria as
stated in Good’s 1986 challenge essay [13]:
The first thing we need in this process is the ability to state
computer security requirements clearly and precisely… so
that a competent professional can study it for a reasonably
short amount of time and, say, “Oh, yes, I agree. If you build
that particular system to that particular requirement, it's
secure enough for that particular purpose.”
These security requirements are critically important because
they establish the foundation upon which analysis and evidences
are used to “judge whether a system is ‘secure’” [13].
For cyber-physical systems (i.e., highly complex systemsof-systems), architectural analysis is often viewed as a critical
enabler for systems security analysis; however, these
approaches are typically focused on lower-level security
decisions. Moreover, they are often poorly understood and
applied in ad hoc fashion. To addresses these gaps this work
suggests a relatively straightforward systems security analysis
approach for understanding, defining, and specifying security
requirements for complex cyber-physical systems. First, a brief
discussion of architectural analysis concepts is provided in
Section II along with a working definition of “cybersecurity
architectural analysis” since none exists in the literature. Section
III surveys several systems-oriented security architecture
analysis approaches from government and industry, while
Section IV assesses how these approaches can be used to more
effectively support a holistic systems security analysis approach

for a given System of Interest (SoI). Based on these results, a
variant of the System Theory Process Analysis approach for
Security (STPA-Sec) is detailed in Section V along with an
example in Section VI. Of note, our suggested conceptual-level
focused systems security analysis approach is tailorable and
comprises three phases of increasing detail which result in
security requirements, architectural security considerations, and
design-level security criteria. Of great importance, these three
phases align with the established systems and software
engineering processes in ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288 and the recently
released NIST Special Publication 800-160, Systems Security
Engineering [14], [15].
Lastly, Section VII summarizes key findings and identifies
promising follow-on research areas for increasing the rigorous
application of systems security engineering and accompanying
analysis approaches for developing secure, safe, and resilient
systems – those which can be more easily understood, defined,
specified, implemented, and verified. Because of the Authors’
affiliation with the U.S. DoD, as well as, the DoD’s
unparalleled investment in systems security, much of the work
presented in this paper has an obvious U.S. DoD perspective;
however, this should not hinder the contribution of this work to
other domains as our intention is to promote and advance the
science of security with respect to understanding the effective
application of systems security engineering processes, activities,
and tasks regardless of the SoI or application domain.
II. FOUNDATIONAL CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS
This section provides historical context for discussing
system-level architectural analysis and, more formally,
discusses key definitions for understanding architectural
analysis for security (i.e., cybersecurity architectural analysis).
Much of the seminal work in the field of architectural analysis
was accomplished by Zachman, who proposed the first system
architecture – a logical construct for capturing, presenting, and
integrating the complexities of modern information systems
[16]. Akin to the multitude of perspectives intrinsic to
construction blueprints (e.g., structural, plumbing, electrical,
etc.), Zachman argued that system architectures should be
composed from many perspectives with varying levels of detail.
Furthermore, he insisted that these perspectives (or views) be
synchronized across the system, forming one integrated
architecture.
Sowa expanded Zachman’s work to form the Information
Systems Architecture (ISA) framework shown in Fig. 1 [17].
Across the ISA framework the interrogatives (what, how,
where, who, when, and why) are explored with six perspectives
(shown as rows) as a means of expressing relationships at
varying levels of detail to guide complex system development
[18]. Thus, the ISA establishes a baseline to enable effective
decision making for new system developments by comparing
and elaborating on desired capabilities, requirements,
components, and functions in a single well-integrated,
enterprise-level model (note, not all 36 views are required; thus,
the ISA is also tailorable). Since its inception, the ISA –
commonly known as “the Zachman Framework” – has been a
popular choice for system architects; it has been widely used for
decades, while several other system-level frameworks have
incorporated or adopted its tenets [19].

A. Key Definitions
As a prerequisite for understanding and assessing the
utilization of architectural analysis approaches for security
decision making, a brief discussion of key definitions is offered.
First, please note that we use the term “cybersecurity” in this
work as it now seems to be the prevailing pseudonym for
“security” regardless of intentionality or context (see sidebar in
[20]). While several competing definitions exist, within the U.S.
DoD, cybersecurity is formally defined as [21]:
The prevention of damage to, protection of, and restoration
of electronic systems to ensure its availability, integrity,
authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation.
While comprehensive, the U.S. DoD’s definition for the
purpose of analyzing cyber-physical SoI is somewhat hindered
because it is saturated with domain-specific IT jargon, where:
availability ensures the system is usable as anticipated; integrity
is the protection from unauthorized modification; confidentiality
is keeping data private; authentication is a validation of the
claimed identity; and non-repudiation is the ability to prove that
an action has taken place [22]. A more practical systemsoriented description of security might simply seek to prevent
hazardous functionality which leads to potentially unsafe
system states with unacceptable losses [23].
The next key term to define is “architecture” where we
interpret “architecture” synonymously with “system
architecture” and variations thereof. As a well-known standard
ISO/IEC/IEEE 42010 provides a rather straightforward
definition for system architecture [24]:
The fundamental organization of a system, embodied in its
components, their relationship to each other and to the
environment, and the principles governing its design and
evolution.
While this definition is readily understandable, it is somewhat
focused on the SoI’s physical realization and does not capture
the desired holistic nature necessary for performing systems
security engineering and analysis [25]. Another classically
understood definition is provided by Maier and Rechtin [26]:
Structure in terms of components, connections, and
constraints of a product, process, or element.
This definition offers a more holistic view of the SoI to include
both technological and non-technological aspects. It also
provides a means for viewing the system from different
perspectives with multiple levels of abstraction as purported by
Zachman. With a full life cycle focused perspective, the U.S.
DoD provides a progressive definition for consideration [27]:
A set of abstractions (or models) that simplify and
communicate complex structures, processes, rules, and
constraints to improve understanding and implementation.
Although somewhat conceptual, this definition alerts the reader
to the intrinsic value offered by architectural efforts in that they
serve to improve communication amongst multiple team
members and increase understanding of complex systems with
the goal of improving the SoI’s implementation (i.e., its
physical realization).

FIG 1. THE ZACHMAN FRAMEWORK FOR ENTERPRISE ARCHITECTURE [27].

Lastly, the task of identifying a formal definition of
“analysis” within the context of a systems architecture proved
more difficult than anticipated. This is because system
architectures often center on an integrated model of entities and
the relationships between the entities to facilitate order and
understandability, not analytical capability. One such definition
reads as follows [28]:

in support of well-informed system security engineering
decisions [30]. More holistically, architectural analysis enables
pragmatic risk management by providing context and functional
mapping to the various physical elements of the SoI. Thus,
cybersecurity architectural analysis facilitates the application of
appropriate security mitigations where needed with rigorous
justification.

Architectural analysis is the activity of discovering
important system properties using conceptual and physical
models of the system of interest.

After considering the seminal definitions presented above
(and others not discussed) and working to understand the
architectural analysis approaches for cybersecurity discussed in
Section III, we propose a working definition of cybersecurity
architectural analysis for consideration:

However, an architecture’s purpose is to increase understanding
and facilitate trade-offs focused on evaluating and comparing
alternative designs and attributes (e.g., security, performance,
reliability, etc.) [15], [19]. This two-fold purpose is acutely
captured by Crawley et al. [29]:
Architectural analysis focuses on understanding both the
architecture’s function and form for the purpose of
supporting decision making.
This definition reflects both the architecture’s inherent ability to
manage complexity and enable analysis in support of more
effective decision making. Ultimately, architectural analysis
requires consideration of various missions, essential functions,
components, and desired system attributes which help to clarify
and refine stakeholder needs and system requirements. Thus,
architectural analysis should identify trade-off points among
competing options and enable more effective communication
between various stakeholders (e.g., customers, developers,
operators, maintainers).
B. Proposed Cybersecurity Architectural Analysis Definition
Architectural analysis provides a means for understanding
cyber (i.e., ICT) dependencies within the functions and form of
the desired system. This type of structured analysis brings an
otherwise unmanageable amount of information under control

The activity of discovering and evaluating the function and
form of a desired system to facilitate cybersecurity decisions.
This definition is easily understandable and addresses both the
conceptual-level analysis associated with new system
development (i.e., studying the desired functionality) and
lower-level considerations for existing systems (i.e., comparing
the desired functionality to the existing form).
III. CYBERSECURITY ARCHITECTURAL ANALYSIS APPROACHES
In this section, we survey architectural analysis approaches
for complex system cybersecurity. Within the U.S. DoD (and its
major defense contractors), several approaches (i.e., methods,
processes, and tools) have been developed to secure and assess
the cybersecurity of complex systems and systems-of-systems.
This survey is based on publicly available literature and
presentations that focus specifically on architectural analysis for
weapon systems. The predecessor for many cybersecurity
architectural analysis approaches is compliance-based
Information Assurance (IA), which focuses almost exclusively
on applying security controls to computer networks and IT

systems. For complex systems this approach is inadequate as
demonstrated by several high profile security breaches [31].
A. Department of Defense Architectural Framework (DoDAF)
The integrated architecture currently in use by the U.S. DoD
is the DoD Architecture Framework (DoDAF). Its purpose is to
manage complexity to enable key decisions through organized
information sharing [27]. However, in DoDAF, like many other
architecture frameworks, security (or cybersecurity) is not
specifically addressed [32]. James Richards, in his work Using
the Department of Defense Architecture Framework to Develop
Security Requirements [30], proposes a methodology for using
DoDAF to derive security requirements. He outlines a process
of first building an architectural model of the enterprise,
focusing on a core set of views including the OV-5b operational
activity model, the DIV-2 logical data model, and the OV-3
operational resource flow matrix. These critical views are used
to model security-relevant processes, data, business rules, and
communications. Next, he suggests comparing views for
compliance and then assessing and refining the architecture.
The overall purpose of Richards’ approach is to use DoDAF to
expose or derive security requirements [30].
B. Unified Architecture Framework (UAF)
In contrast to the U.S. DoD unique solution DoDAF,
industry has developed the Unified Architecture Framework
(UAF) [33]. Based on industry need, the UAF includes a formal
security domain amongst the more common architectural views.
The UAF security domain includes views for security
taxonomy, structure, connectivity, processes, constraints, and
traceability. More specifically, it uses SysML class diagrams to
identify data types and map them to protections and security
controls. As an integrated architecture, it allows securityrelevant elements to be mapped to system resources and
operations. UAF also capitalizes on the success of MBSE
efforts to depict and analyze the security properties of a SoI via
an executable architecture. Note, UAF is in the final stages of
development, so its utility has yet to be fully realized; however,
the proposed security views appear to be useful for conducting
cybersecurity architectural analysis [34].
C. Publically Avilable Industry Efforts
Major defense contractors often use custom architectural
analysis approaches to design and evaluate their system
architectures with respect to cybersecurity. Although it is likely
that most large U.S. DoD contractors are working solutions in
this area; at the time of this survey, the authors were only
exposed to efforts from Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, and
Lockheed Martin. Note, Raytheon’s Cyber Resiliency
Architecture Framework (CRAF) was the only approach with a
detailed open source publication available. Limited information
is available on Northrop and Lockheed’s approaches.
Raytheon developed CRAF using a DoDAF reference
architecture with extensions for specific cyber resilience
mappings and metrics [35]. The goal of CRAF is to assess and
identify gaps in cyber resiliency by mapping systems,
subsystems, and components against prioritized capabilities to
identify resilience requirements for important mission scenarios.
Using failure modes and effects analysis, Northrop
Grumman created a risk-based assessment methodology using

an integrated architecture modeled in the new UAF to identify
cyber risks for their systems [34]. This approach is still under
development and is one of the first systems security efforts
based on the upcoming UAF standard security views from the
Object Management Group (OMG).
Lockheed Martin has created a custom solution titled the
Secure Engineering Assurance Model (SEAM) [36]. SEAM is a
tailored systems security engineering approach to integrate
security into every solution they deliver. This framework
provides tailored security considerations and checklists for each
program area.
D. Risk Management Framework (RMF) for Cybersecurity
In response to increasing risks against critical infrastructure
and information technology systems, the US government
enacted the Federal Information Security Management Act of
2002 which established minimum information security
requirements for federal information systems, and charged the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) with
developing security standards and guidelines to address these
growing risks [37]. In response to this requirement, NIST
created the Risk Management Framework (RMF) which
provided a structured yet flexible process for applying these
standards and guidelines [38]. Accordingly, RMF is the
mandated approach for addressing cybersecurity in the U.S.
DoD [10]. In general, this approach applies a prescriptive riskbased methodology to cybersecurity with the goal of
identifying, mitigating, and eliminating system vulnerabilities to
protect systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure,
disruption, modification, or destruction. Within the United
States Air Force, the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center
is tasked with conducting RMF for legacy weapon systems
(designated as the Platform IT (PIT) systems) [39]. This PIT
assessment and authorization process consists of six steps
described in the next paragraph [12].
First, the team must categorize the PIT system according to
the information displayed, processed, stored, and transmitted
along with the classification of the information and associated
technologies. Second, security controls are selected (or
assigned) based on the impact resulting from the loss of said
information (i.e., criticality analysis) [11]. The third step is
implementing said controls with consideration for cybersecurity
requirements across the entire system development life cycle—
although security controls have been historically applied to IT
systems, many have been tailored for PIT systems with
prescribed overlays [39]. The fourth step is key to the RMF
process and assesses the effectiveness of applied security
controls through threat mapping and vulnerability analysis. On a
related note, much of the security work conducted today is
exclusively focused on this step. Based on the identified
vulnerabilities, the fifth step is to produce a risk assessment and
mitigation plan, which is then briefed to the Authorization
Official for authorization. The sixth step of the RMF process is
continuous monitoring of the system with respect to
cybersecurity. As the system and threat environment evolve
over time, security control effectiveness needs to be
continuously assessed while keeping in mind future changes
and cybersecurity impact.

E. Avionics Cyberspace Vulnerability Assessment and
Mitigation (ACVAM) and Cyber Hardening Efforts
The United States Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL),
in conjunction with the Air Force Institute of Technology’s
Center for Cyberspace Research, developed an Avionics
Cyberspace Vulnerability Assessment and Mitigation
(ACVAM) Workshop [40]. This weapon-system-specific
workshop teaches a thorough analysis approach by
systematically identifying and assessing all external inputs and
communications paths to and from a weapon system (i.e., an
exhaustive boundary analysis of the system’s architecture). The
major activities include gathering information, identifying and
analyzing access points, finding and analyzing susceptibilities,
anticipating attacks, and applying and recommending
mitigations and protections. The ACVAM approach requires
extensive Subject Matter Expert (SME) involvement, access to
design documents, and detailed operator insight to discover
susceptibilities and determine appropriate mitigations to
increase mission assurance by eliminating or reducing
vulnerability to cyberattacks [41].
Additionally, AFRL is developing more specific cyber
hardening tools and resiliency instructions [42]. While specific
details are not publicly available, the cyber hardening approach
was recently briefed to the defense community at large [41]. In
general, this approach describes avionics cyber hardening and
resiliency concepts and suggests ways to protect avionics and
related systems from cyber-attack. Moreover, this approach
encourages engineers to ‘think avionics cyber’ using three
tenets of cyber protection: focus on what’s critical; restrict
access to the critical; and detect, react, and adapt [43].
F. Attack Path Analysis via Automotive Example
Historically, attack path analysis has served the security
community well [44]. In a great example from the automotive
domain, Checkoway et al. provide a practical attack path
analysis and comprehensive discussion which solidifies the
importance of threat modeling as a cybersecurity architectural
analysis technique [6]. While this specific example is
automobile centric, many similarities are shared between cyberphysical systems. More specifically, the work details a four-step
method of analyses. First, threat model characterization is
accomplished through identification of external attack vectors
and attack surfaces. Second, vulnerability analysis addresses the
accessibility, criticality, and exploitability of potential
vulnerabilities. Third, a threat assessment attempts to gauge the
attacker’s motivation by answering the question of what utility a
given attack path has for the attacker. Finally, the approach
suggests mitigation actions by synthesizing similarities among
vulnerabilities to provide pragmatic recommendations for
enhancing the system’s cybersecurity.
G. System Theory Process Analysis for Security (STPA-Sec)
In recent work, MIT’s System Theory Process Analysis
(STPA) approach for safety was extended to focus on
security-related concerns, known as STPA-Sec [45]. The goal of
this approach is to ensure mission-critical functions are
maintained in the face of disruption(s). Starting from a strategic
viewpoint, system developers and users can proactively shape
the operational environment by controlling specified mission
critical system risks. This top-down approach elevates the

security problem from guarding the system (or network) against
all potential attack paths to a higher-level problem of assuring
the system’s critical functions. The STPA-Sec steps include:
identifying unacceptable losses, identifying system hazards
(vulnerabilities), drawing the system functional control
structure, and identifying unsafe or insecure CAs [45]. This
method has been embraced by defense and commercial
industries with several favorable case studies [46].
H. Functional Mission Analysis for Cyber (FMA-C)
The DoD has adopted Functional Mission Analysis for
Cyber (FMA-C) as an approach to secure operational computer
networks [47]. FMA-C is being taught to thousands of airmen
in an effort to assure critical cyber systems and reduce
vulnerabilities. While the structure and content of FMA-C is
similar to STPA-Sec, its application is tailored to As-Is
Information Technology infrastructures. In practice, USAF
Mission Defense Teams apply FMA-C to fielded cyber systems
to identify mission critical vulnerabilities. It has proved to be a
useful tool for understanding and mitigating risks in traditional
cyber (i.e. ICT) domains.
I. Other Notable Methodologies
As previously noted, other methodologies and frameworks
for systems-level security analysis are sure to exist which are
not covered in this work. A few notable works focused on
mission assurance are available here [48], [49], [50] and on
software here [51], [52].
IV. CHARACTERISTICS FOR EFFECTIVE
CYBERSECURITY ARCHITECTURAL ANALYSIS
This section identifies desirable characteristics for
cybersecurity architectural analysis and cross-examines the
approaches discussed in Section III.
A. Cybersecurity Architectural Analysis Characteristics
The first characteristic is definitional in nature and classifies
approaches as either top-down or bottom-up. Those defined as
top-down start with analysis at the function level with
identification and examination of critical missions and/or
capabilities—sometimes operations depending on how the
approach is being applied. As is typical of architecting for new
systems (and sometimes upgrades), higher-level functional
analysis leads to further functional decomposition and
allocation to a more specific form (e.g., lower subsystems,
elements, or components). These approaches lend themselves to
the identification of stakeholder security needs, early trade-offs,
thorough security requirements definition, and integration of
more holistic security solutions [15].
Conversely, bottom-up approaches begin with the form in
mind (i.e., the physical or technological solution) and often
focus on perimeter security through boundary analysis [53].
While this approach successfully identifies vulnerabilities in
networked components, it is often less useful for protecting
systems from intelligent adversaries. For example, Bayuk and
Horowitz [54] surmise that perimeter defense tactics are largely
ineffective, and conclude that a top-down, risk-based systems
engineering approach to system security should be used instead.

The next key characteristic is whether the approach should
be driven by threats or vulnerabilities. Prior research suggests
that the foundation for improving system security starts with an
analysis of potential threats, which leads to more appropriate
security requirements for implementation [44]. This is intuitive;
without first understanding the adversary—system-specific
threats (and their rapid agility)—it is difficult, or impossible, to
defend against them. Understanding and modeling the threat
becomes a critical prerequisite for generating and developing
secure systems [55]. Once the model has been developed and
validated, vulnerability analysis is the logical follow-on. With
the threats understood, the system architecture can be analyzed
for vulnerable access points through techniques such as attack
path analysis and/or red teaming.
While acknowledging the rapidly changing nature of threats,
the exercise of red teaming and brainstorming potential attack
paths is a helpful critical thinking exercise for ensuring sound
cybersecurity practices. Moreover, threat modeling and
vulnerability analysis typically form the foundation for
cybersecurity architectural analysis. While threat modeling
alone does not ensure cybersecurity, rigorous threat modeling
and vulnerability analysis are helpful for ensuring the security
of realized systems. However, more focus should be applied to
providing security solutions and not just focused on identifying
problems.
In today’s highly contested cyberspace environment,
documentation-based engineering is largely ineffective against
dynamic adversaries [44]. Developing a successful response to a
dynamic adversary necessitates the tools and methods used to
develop countermeasures be, in kind, dynamic. In response to
these complexities, Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE)
offers an integrated modeling approach capable of mapping
desired capabilities to functions (and even components), as well
as providing traceability and fit-for-purpose views to enable
more effective decision-making [56]. In a recent effort, Apvrille
and Roudier proposed SysML-Sec, an injection of security
considerations into SysML in an effort to foster integration
between system designers and security experts [57]. SysML-Sec
and more generally MBSE approaches enable security-focused
computer simulations of a potential system architecture. These
executable architectures provide tremendous value by providing
insights into early design trade-off analysis [58]. While MBSE
requires significant initial investment in tools and training, it
significantly increases the depth of possible architectural
analysis especially in executable architectures..

and tend to scale poorly. Top-down approaches have the benefit
of being more scalable, but they often require a high level of
tool proficiency to effectively model (thus, the potential of
MBSE to systems security is largely missed). While
vulnerability analysis is inherent in every approach, a threatbased approach is less so. This aspect is important because
effectively safeguarding unprecedented, complex systems
requires more than a good architectural tool or technique – a
holistic engineering approach that embraces all aspects of
security (e.g., people, processes, policy, technology, feasibility,
cost, etc.) is required [59], [60].
While providing a detailed case study for each approach
surveyed in this work would be ideal, it is simply not feasible as
some approaches take months if not years to complete. Thus,
we chose to further explore STPA-Sec as relatively simple and
effective means for performing systems security analysis for a
complex SoI. For example, STPA-Sec can be accomplished
without extensive training and can be accomplished in a matter
of days rather than months [61]. While STPA-Sec does not
formally use MBSE tools, this decision was primarily driven by
STPA-Sec’s top-down approach which begins in the conceptual
phase of the system life cycle—earlier than other approaches
considered (e.g. starting with the Business or Mission Analysis
technical processes in ISO/ISE/IEEE 15288) [61].
TABLE I: ARCHITECTURAL APPROACHES TO CHARACTERISTICS MAPPING.
Top Bottom Threat Vul.
MBSE
MBSE
Tool
Down Up
Driven Based Integrated Executable Based
DoDAF +
X1
X
X
X4
X
Richards
1
X
X
X
X
X
X
CRAF
UAF
4
X
X
X
X
X
Security
X
X
X
ACVAM
X
STPA-Sec X2
X5
X
X
X3
RMF
1. Promotes a top-down approach after mission functions are identified (i.e.,
does not include mission thread analysis).
2. Approach begins at a higher level than other approaches examined (i.e.,
includes mission thread analysis) and includes lower level analysis.
3. Suggests using MBSE, but not required and often not considered.
4. Would require pairing with additional modeling & simulation plugin.
5. RMF is intended to be a top-down approach but is often applied bottom-up
using security control compliance based on system type.

V. SYSTEMS SECURITY STPA-SEC ANALYSIS APPROACH

B. Mapping of Characteristics to Approaches
Table I provides a mapping of the proposed architectural
analysis characteristics to the surveyed approaches from Section
III. This mapping seeks to provide a consolidated reference for
differentiating approaches to inform the user and assist in
selecting an appropriate cybersecurity architectural approach
which meets the stakeholders’ needs. Consideration is given to
each approaches’ usability, scalability, and tool availability. The
ideal approach will also easily facilitate modeling and
simulation studies to perform early design feasibility studies and
support trade-off analysis (i.e., MBSE).

STPA-Sec is a promising approach for performing
conceptual systems security analysis based on a methodology of
systems theory dating back to Leveson’s original systems safety
work which has been well received within the safety,
aeronautical, and systems engineering communities [23], [46].
STPA-Sec is an extension of this methodology to the security
domain and has been shown to effectively address security
issues in complex cyber-physical systems [63]. In this section
and the one that follows, we seek to highlight some of STPASec’s utility in facilitating early security and resiliency
requirements generation with traceability to the stakeholders’
mission.

In general, bottom-up approaches are relatively systematic;
however, historically they have not produced secure systems

In Table II, we present the STPA-Sec approach organized
into three levels of systems security analysis: Conceptual,

Architectural, and Design. Of great importance, these levels
align well with the established systems and software
engineering processes in ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288, and the recently
released NIST SP 800-160 [14], [15]. This systems-oriented
approach begins at the highest level of abstraction with the
Business/mission Analysis (BA) and Stakeholder Needs and
requirements definition (SN) processes to define early security
requirements. Next, the System Requirements definition (SR)
and Architecture Definition (AR) processes explore potential
architectures and the desired system capability from a functional
level which results in architectural specific “design-to” criteria.
In the third phase, potential general forms of the system are
considered and analyzed in the Design definition (DE) process
which results in specific “build-to” criteria. Table II provides a
general assessment of each phase’s difficulty and duration, as
well as, a listing of the number of STPA-Sec steps each of
which are elaborated upon below.
TABLE II: SYSTEMS SECURITY ANALYSIS STPA-SEC OVERVIEW.
Systems Security Oriented STPA-Sec Phases
Concept
Analysis
Determine
Security
Requirements

Architectural
Analysis
Determine
Design-To
Criteria

Design
Analysis
Determine
Build-To
Criteria

ISO/IEC/IEEE
Process

BA/SN

SR/AR

DE

Difficulty

Easy

Easy

Moderate

Duration

Hours

Days

Weeks

STPA-Sec Steps

4 Steps

5 Steps

5 Steps

Purpose

A. Concept Analysis
As shown in Table III, the four conceptually-oriented
STPA-Sec steps start with mission-level analysis to prevent the
system from entering hazardous system states that could lead to
unacceptable losses and mission failure. Beginning systems
security analysis at the mission-level allows security engineers
to more accurately understand the stakeholders’ needs and
maximizes the engineering trade space as system goals are
transformed into constraints (i.e., early safety, security, and
resiliency requirements).
TABLE III: STPA-SEC CONCEPT ANALYSIS.
Step
1. Define the SoI’s
purpose and goal

2. Identify unacceptable
losses

Description
Capture the mission statement and key activities
of the system:
1) A system to: (What)
2) By Means of: (How)
3) In Order to: (Why)
Define high level, intolerable system outcomes
to key stakeholders (e.g., loss of life, injury,
damage to equipment, reputation, mission, etc.).

3. Identify hazards

Identify system states that when coupled with
worst case conditions lead to an unacceptable
loss.

4. Develop system
security constraints

Develop mission-informed security constraints
that prevent the system from entering hazardous
states. These constraints are synonymous with
early safety, security, and resiliency functional
requirements.

The first step of STPA-Sec defines the SoI’s mission in
terms of a purpose and goal from the stakeholders’ perspective
(akin to the BA and SN processes). This is done in a relatively
straightforward fashion with emphasis on stakeholder
involvement by standardizing the mission statement into three
parts: 1) A system to 2) by means of 3) in order to. The first
phrase “A system to” is meant to capture the primary purpose of
the system (i.e., the What) in a few words. The “by means of”
identifies the activities or processes the system uses to achieve
its purpose (i.e., the How). Lastly, the “In order to” identifies
the goal, or what mission the system contributes to (i.e., the
Why). Accurately defining the desired system’s purpose and
goal requires involvement from key stakeholders such as
mission owner(s), operators, and users. Moreover, correctly
defining the mission (or business case) provides a baseline for
prioritizing and performing security tradeoffs within an
operationally-focused paradigm.
The second step of STPA-Sec identifies unacceptable losses.
An unacceptable loss is an specific, unacceptable outcome as
defined by mission and system owners (i.e., the key
stakeholders). An unacceptable loss should be specific and at a
high level. The system losses should identify what is of highest
value to the stakeholders and differentiate from what is nice to
have/desired. Unacceptable losses can be mission, personnel, or
equipment loss; common unacceptable losses include loss of life
and loss of mission essential equipment. Any outcome that a
key stakeholder is concerned about should be identified. For
example, loss of reputation or loss of critical data are examples
of unacceptable losses that can be addressed through STPA-Sec.
Given the importance of these unacceptable losses to the
mission system and stakeholders, they provide key information
to drive requirements for safety, survivability, and security.
The third step identifies hazards that can contribute to these
unacceptable losses. STPA defines a hazard as a system state
(or set of conditions) that together with a worst-case set of
environmental conditions will lead to an unacceptable loss [63].
The hazards identified should be within the system boundary
and not themselves an environmental condition or external
actor. As a general rule, hazards should be abstracted up to the
highest level possible and in most cases the list of hazards will
be fewer than 10. Identifying hazards can also serve to refine
and clarify the list of unacceptable losses, as each hazard should
be mapped to one or more unacceptable losses (otherwise it is
not a hazard or the list of unacceptable losses is incomplete)
[63].
Controlling hazards is STPA-Sec’s conceptual mechanism
for delivering system cybersecurity. The mechanism is based on
Leveson’s STAMP model that associates the high-level
unacceptable losses as arising from control deficiencies across
the system rather than component failures. The control
deficiencies manifest as problems between components
(interactions) rather than simple mechanical failures. The latter
have been the traditional cause of failures in mechanical
systems, but the former provides much more utility when
developing contemporary large, software-intense systems.
Hazardous states are a necessary precondition to loss. For
example, if the unacceptable loss is two aircraft colliding, then
the associated hazard could be generalized as failing to maintain
safe separation between the aircraft. If safe separation is

maintained, the two aircraft should never collide. The need for
safe separation can be identified based on the first part of
STPA-Sec. Ensuring safe separation is maintained (a control
function) throughout operations is an engineering problem and
can be addressed through systems engineering (secure systems
engineering specifically). There are several different ways the
violation might occur. The air traffic control system might be
hacked or attacked. One or both of the aircraft might be
subjected to a cyber attack. Likewise, there are any number of
mitigations that can be used to address the hazard. However, at
this stage of the System Engineering process, the hazardous
functionality (safe separation not enforced) is already identified.
In other words, loss prevention functionality (safe separation
enforcement) is now identified and the remainder of the
engineering process can focus on developing a suitable
architecture to enforce this functionality. This approach allows
engineers to handle safety and security in the same manner that
all other emergent system properties are addressed. The systems
approach does not preclude the need for reliable components.
STPA-Sec still identifies scenarios involving component failure,
but it also highlights complex, highly interactive scenarios
involving management decisions, operations processes and
operators. These other factors are also contributory to many
losses. Therefore ensuring safe and secure operations must go
beyond a focus on technology.

analysis of their criticality and how they contribute to
preventing the SoI from entering hazardous states (akin to the
SR process). The output of STPA-Sec Architectural analysis
identifies potentially hazardous or unsecure CAs for a given
system architecture (akin to the AR process). In essence these
CAs form system level security requirements given a system
architecture.

The fourth step of the concept analysis phase is to develop
system security constraints that prevent the SoI from entering
one of the previously identified hazardous states. These
constraints are restrictions placed on the system (and
implemented via the security architecture) to bound operation
within acceptable parameters. In this way, the first four steps of
STPA-Sec begin to specify acceptable and non-acceptable
system states which can eventually be formally tested and
verified when the architecture is developed. The insights gained
through STPA-Sec can also be used to inform and improve
early MBSE efforts. These safety and security focused
constraints also provide stakeholder-focused traceability for
safety, security, and resiliency requirements which are
important for system survivability (a critical issue in U.S. DoD
systems [64]).

The first step of this phase identifies each of the key model
elements including actors, controllers, actuators, sensors, and
controlled processes. Figure 2 illustrates a basic control
structure example. Starting from the bottom of the model, the
controlled process(es) is(are) the previously identified (Concept
Analysis Step 1) activities the system uses to achieve its
purpose. Beginning with these “How” activities, the primary
task in step 1 of STPA-Sec architectural analysis is identifying
the controller and actors responsible for performing the process.

B. Architectural Analysis
STPA-Sec Architectural Analysis is a continuation of the
conceptual phase and examines the SoI at the functional level
(rather than a form specific implementation as is often the case
in cybersecurity analyses). This approach maintains the largest
trade space for potential solutions and helps ensure the desired
system functionality is implemented without unnecessary
architectural and design constrictions.
Table IV details the necessary steps to perform STPA-Sec
architectural analysis where a functional control model is used
to represent the SoI. The functional control structure can be
accomplished at various levels of abstraction such that an entire
system is represented as a single model or it can be decomposed
into multiple sub-models used to more specifically understand
the control the SoI’s functions. This tailorable approach uses
functional decomposition to more thoroughly understand critical
mission-essential relationships between key actors and
processes represented as Control Actions (CA). The phase
begins with identification of all required CAs followed by an

TABLE IV: STPA-SEC ARCHITECTURAL ANALYSIS.
Step
1. Identify model
elements

Description
Identify actor(s), controller(s), and controlled
process(es) for the SoI at the desired level of
abstraction.

2. Identify each
elements’
responsibilities

Capture the description and actions planned to
be taken for the model elements identified.

3. Model control
relationships

Organize the model elements to pictorial
show the relationships between elements in a
functional control structure.

4. Identify Control
Actions (CA)

Captures (in verb form) the actions necessary
for each element to execute their
responsibilities.

5. Complete the CA
analysis table

This table systematically enumerates which
hazards are caused by each CA identified in
step 4.

Once model elements are identified, then responsibilities for
actors and controllers are populated in step 2. This step involves
capturing these important responsibilities and assigning them to
the appropriate actor for each controlled process (or action).
These responsibilities can be identified from operational or
system documentation, and in particular discussions with users,
system SME’s, and other stakeholders. The third step primarily
organizes the previously identified model elements into a
functional control structure (i.e., a model) as shown in Figure 2.
Step 4 identifies CAs for the system. A CA is a terse verb
(action) statement capturing the execution of a function (or task)
necessary to control the subject process. Populating the list of
CAs begins with pairing down the responsibilities previously
identified in step 2 into CAs that an actor or controller performs
to manage the controlled process. CAs exist at various levels of
abstraction based on the desired depth of analysis. Often it is
best to start at the highest level of abstraction for the initial
functional architectural analysis and then move to potentially
hazardous actions as previously identified.
The bulk of STPA-Sec architectural analysis resides in the
fifth step – populating a CA analysis table (an example is
provided in Section VI). This step requires a thorough analysis
of each CA identified in step 4 and enumerates what, if any,
hazardous conditions can be created by the systems’ actions.
More specifically, each CA is evaluated across four scenarios:

the CA is not provided; the CA is provided; the CA is provided
too late, too early, or out of sequence; and the CA is stopped too
soon or applied too long. This analysis clearly identifies when
CAs need to be applied and not applied in order to prevent
unsafe or unsecure hazardous states from occurring during
system operation. This step provides an initial “design-to”
criteria which is further decomposed and studied during design.
FIG 2. STPA BASIC CONTROL STRUCTURE. FROM [63].

potential PMV values are properly understood to specify
potentially hazardous systems states. Step 4 identifies the
sensors which are responsible for generating said PMV values
(i.e., data) to include conventional sensors, personnel, computer
systems, etc. This step also lends insight into which feedback
sensors are critical to monitor for potentially hazardous states
and enforce CAs. Steps 1-4 produce a list of preliminary design
considerations to include detailed CAs and PMVs which specify
functional logic to inform subsystem and component
implementation and verification.
Step 5 of STPA-Sec design analysis is the generation of
causal scenarios where the impact of environmental conditions
(previously explored during conceptual analysis) are examined
to more specifically understand and assess how losses may
occur. Akin to tabletop red teaming, causal scenario generation
is typically conducted by system experts, well-qualified users,
and threat analysts with the goal of identifying plausible
scenarios (or conditions combined with effects outside the
system boundary) that violate or breach a constraint. In a
general sense, this final step also serves to provide validation
for the thoroughness of the entire STPA-Sec analysis effort. In
this way, changes or additional constraints are often identified
as part of the causal scenarios when attempting to ‘break’ the
SoI.
TABLE V: STPA-SEC DESIGN ANALYSIS.

C. Design Analysis
The STPA-Sec Design Analysis phase studies the specifics
of a CA using relatively simple process models and scenarios.
These process models enumerate the decision logic, key
variables, and acceptable variable values associated with each
CA in a systematic and straight forward fashion. Additionally,
this analysis identifies which feedback mechanism is
responsible for those process model variable values (e.g., a
sensor or computing mechanism). STPA-Sec design analysis
focuses on more thoroughly understanding and specifying the
CAs which prevent the SoI from entering potentially hazardous
and unsecure states. The steps of design analysis are captured in
Table V.
Step 1 of STPA-Sec Design Analysis develops process
model descriptions. During this step, it is advantageous to first
generate process model descriptions for CAs determined as
potentially hazardous from the completed STPA-Sec
Architectural Analysis. This is because a complex system may
have a large (and potentially overwhelming) number of process
model descriptions. Each process model should briefly describe
the scenario of interest and focus on when to execute a given
CA with details such as identifying the specific system elements
and potential responses to CAs. Additionally, the process model
should include assumptions about the controlled process.
In step 2, Process Model Variables (PMVs) are described as
various conditions which indicate a system state (i.e., one of a
number of discrete states the SoI could exist in). These
conditions and states are then enumerated in step 3 to ensure all

Step
1. Develop process
model descriptions

Description
Describes the decision logic (“in plain English”)
for executing a given CA.

2. Identify Process
Model Variables (PMV)

PMVs are measurable indicators of the
conditions that trigger a CA.

3. Specify PMV values

PMV values are all the possible values a PMV
can be assigned both acceptable and hazardous.

4. Identify PMV
sensors

Identifies which sensors provide PMV values to
the actors and controller for decision making.

5. Carry out causal
scenarios

Brainstorm how a specific implementation of the
system may be compromised. Identifies critical
CAs and validates the thoroughness of the
model, CAs, and constraints.

VI. AUTONOMOUS RESUPPPLY SPACE VEHICLE CASE STUDY
In this section, we provide a simplified case study
highlighting STPA-Sec’s utility for eliciting and defining safety,
security, and resiliency requirements, as well as, specifying
design and implementation criteria which can be formally
verified. This section demonstrates STPA-Sec’s high-level flow
and outputs, and is not intended to be a comprehensive analysis
(additional examples available here [46]). This case study was
initially conducted as an ad hoc working group consisting of
engineers, operators, and mission owners, the details of which
have been obfuscated by discussing a notional autonomous
resupply space vehicle (i.e., a complex cyber-physical system).
Additionally, this discussion extends a recent satellite STPA
analysis performed by Thomas [65].
Iterative analysis of STPA-Sec’s various phases is
encouraged and somewhat limited to the expertise and skillset
of those generating the scenarios. It is highly recommended to

generate these scenarios with expertise from system operators,
SME’s, and with those familiar with likely threats because
STPA-Sec asks operators and SMEs context-specific, direct
questions rather than general, ambiguous questions. For
example, an operator might be asked why they might activate
an ABORT command for the loss of communications with the
vehicle (or perhaps better yet, how long would they reasonably
wait before they activated the ABORT command if
communication had been lost). Perhaps more importantly, the
very inclusion of the ABORT functionality can be discussed
and presented as a security trade before the functionality is
designed into the architecture. Hypothetically, the ABORT
command might be used to terminate the mission and return the
vehicle to earth before resupply had been completed. The
functionality might be included to prevent damage to the
vehicle or ISS in the case of communications loss. However,
the functionality might also be used by an attacker to cause
mission failure. Through early discussions with operators and
stakeholders, alternative means might be devised to ensure the
safety of the vehicle in the case of a loss of communications.
The approach described is fundamentally different than current
security approaches that would focus on assuring the
functionality after it was already included in the architecture.
STPA-Sec facilitates a discussion on whether or not particular
functionality should be included and allows an early
assessment as to the degree engineers believe the functionality
can be assured. Obviously, if functionality costs more to secure
than it adds to mission completion, serious consideration
should be given to not including (instantiating) the
functionality into the architecture.
Obviously, not every scenario can be imagined, but the
STPA-Sec produces a set of hazardous scenarios that will lead
to the unacceptable losses if they occur under the worst case
environmental conditions (that are beyond the ability of the
engineering team to control). Operator insights are used to
develop and improve the architecture. The top-down approach
ensures that operators and SMEs only focus on scenarios that
lead to losses of interest to stakeholders. The approach is also
much more focused than simply asking operators, “what might
go wrong.” Not every adverse situation will lead to a loss that
stakeholders care about. Proposing solutions to a security
problem that does not concern the key stakeholders adds
unnecessary cost and complexity to the system.
A. Concept Analysis Phase
To begin the analysis, we first clarified and documented the
system’s intended mission by defining the system’s purpose and
goal with several key stakeholders. High-level documentation
such as ConOps, OpCons, gap analysis, mission needs
statements, and any use cases are reviewed with data parsed into
the framework depicted below. This phase is essential for
properly understanding the scope of the security problem (i.e.,
context) while simultaneously not over limiting the solution
space. For example, from a holistic systems perspective
technical and procedural security solutions should be equally
considered.

A system to do (what): Autonomously resupply the
International Space Station (ISS)
By means of (how): Launching, Flying proper trajectories,
docking, and returning to Earth
In order to (why): Maintain operations on the ISS in a
cost-effective manner while minimizing risk to astronauts
Next, we considered any unacceptable losses with respect to
the stated system’s mission. Initial stakeholder discussions
(facilitated by the initial mission statement) resulted in a
number of lower level losses which were consolidated into a
list of three high-level unacceptable losses. While the list can
be more or less detailed, three losses satisfies our needs to
ensure they were sufficiently different:
1. Loss or significant damage to Vehicle or ISS
2. Loss of vehicle cargo
3. Death or Injury to astronauts
The third step includes identifying hazards which may
contribute to or result in these unacceptable losses. This is done
by considering the functionality necessary for the completion
of the mission (in this case: Launch, Flight, Docking and
Return). Hazards can contribute to multiple losses, but must
contribute to at least one unacceptable loss. The goal at this
point is not to identify every possible undesirable outcome. For
instance, temporary losses of communication with the vehicle
are undesirable, however, at this point we are focusing only on
hazards that can lead to outcomes that stakeholders have
agreed are unacceptable and must be mitigated (such as loss of
the cargo).
Another important point is that all the hazards must be
under the control of the systems engineers designing the
system. Space weather would not be considered a hazard,
however, the system exceeding operating temperature
tolerances (such as might occur from space weather) would be
a hazard requiring engineers to design a suitable environmental
control system. Detailed causal scenarios such as space
weather extremes are handled later in the scenario development
phase (as are generic cyber attacks). Likewise, operator error is
not a hazard per se, but operator failure to issue a docking
command when required would be a detailed causal scenario.
Like maintaining adequate environmental control onboard the
vehicle, the focus is maintaining desired functionality (i.e., an
operator issuing proper commands under the proper
conditions).
Table VI lists a high-level set of hazards for the example.
scenario. This is done in a simple table with the losses listed
across the top and potential hazards along the left-hand side.
The preliminary analysis is not complete at this point. Early
systems engineering analysis and conceptual design should
focus on functionality not the particular form the architecture
will take. One limitation of “baking in” cyber security has been
the dependence on having detailed information about the
particular “form” or architecture under consideration (e.g
Operating systems). STPA-Sec enables security analysis
without such detailed information. In the simplified example,

the basic functionality the resupply vehicle requires to
complete the mission was specified during the initial phase of
the analysis. The vehicle must have functionality to launch, fly
trajectory, dock, and return. Instantiating this functionality in a
vehicle that is secure and resilient is the ultimate goal of the
security engineering effort.
TABLE VI: HAZARDS AND LOSSES MAPPING.

X

X

X

X

L3: Loss of Vehicle payload

L2: Significant Damage to
ISS or Vehicle

H1: Failure to Maintain Safe Separation
between ISS and Vehicle
H2: Exceed Safe Closure rate between
vehicle and ISS
H3: Payload Environment not maintained
within limits

L1: Loss of Vehicle or ISS
Hazards

Losses

X

B. Architectural Analysis Phase
Figure 3 depicts a high-level functional control structure
that engineers can use to better define and reason about how
the set of 4 basic functionalities can be assured, meaning that
their behavior can be bounded within acceptable limits. The
simple block diagram consists of a ground system, an
automated control and data handling system aboard the vehicle,
an environmental system, a movement control system, and
“other subsystems.” We previously determined that one of the
unacceptable losses is damage to the vehicle and/or ISS. A
hazard under the control of the designers is exceeding the safe
closure rate between the vehicle and the ISS during docking
(one of the high-level functions). The closure rate might occur
accidentally or it might occur as the result of a cyber attack on
some part of the system. However, an early but critical design
choice is how the docking functionality will be implemented.
The functional structure represents two different
architectures (with one potentially easier to assure against
disruptions than the other). Perhaps locking out the ground
segment from providing commands during the docking
maneuver might be advisable. If such separation were desired,
then any C2 attacks on the ground segment would not disrupt
the docking functionality. However, severing C2 with the
ground segment during the docking process eliminates the
possibility of ground controller intervention if an unexpected
situation arises. Security and resilience are not the only
architectural trades impacting the connectivity of the ISS,
ground segment, and the vehicle. Cost and complexity are also
factors. Inclusion of only two of the three might reduce cost
and complexity. Likewise, perhaps the ground only requires an
ABORT function. The point is not to decide these factors
solely on the basis of the STPA-Sec analysis, but the analysis,

as it proceeds, enables and facilitates a security discussion
during the early trades where the key decisions are made
instead of asking security engineers to “secure” an architecture
that may be unsecureable.
Figure 4 decomposes the initial depiction in Figure 3 to
facilitate deeper analysis. The simplified example now turns to
increasing understanding on how particular hazards can be
mitigated in the design to follow and the requirements for
achieving this end. Mitigating H2 is examined in more detail.
Closure rate and position are controlled by the maneuver
control system. The engineering challenge is defining a
functional structure that will maintain closure rates within
desired limits.
Figure 4 further decomposes the functionality into a control
loop model consisting of the sensing functions, the controlling
functions, and the thruster or actuation functions. The STPASec analysis provides a verifiable set of commands (or CAs)
necessary to perform all mission functions. In a complete
STPA-Sec analysis, a full enumeration of controls actions
required for each basic functionality (launching, flying,
docking, and returning) would be captured. In this example for
brevity we have selected a single CA for further analysis. For
docking, the CA list would include an INCREASE THRUST
command. The INCREASE THRUST command is necessary
to perform the docking process, however, if applied the wrong
time (or continued too long) it can create H2. The next portion
of the analysis identifies the context under which issuing the
INCREASE THRUST command might create a hazard or
situation where failure to issue the command creates a hazard.
This analysis is accomplished through the Control Action
Analysis Table, Table VII.

FIG 3. HIGH LEVEL STRUCTURE WITH ISS CONTROL OF DOCKING. FROM [63].

FIG 4. REFINED CONTROL STRUCTURE. FROM [63].

If an attacker wishing to damage the ISS or vehicle was
somehow able to issue the INCREASE THRUST command
when the vehicle was already at max desirable speed or when
the vehicle was in close proximity to the station, a hazardous
situation (H1 or H2) develops. The hazardous situation does
not necessarily mean a loss will occur, but the hazardous
situation is a necessary precondition for the loss to occur. Thus,
if the functionality can be controlled within the desired limits
in the face of intentional and unintentional disruptions, then a
case can be made for the system’s resilience and security.
Issuing the INCREASE THRUST command when the vehicle
is at max acceptable speed in close proximity to the ISS places
the system in a hazardous state. The CA analysis table is the
culminating product of the architecture analysis capturing
critical analysis for informing the system design further
explored in the design analysis phase of STPA-Sec.
TABLE VII: STPA-SEC CONTROL ACTION (CA) ANALYSIS.

Control
Action

Increase
Thrust

Not
providing
causes
Hazard
CA-ACS-#
1a: Not
providing
INCREASE
THRUST
command is
hazardous if
thrust is
required to
slow closure
rate to safe
speed [ H-1,
H-2]

Providing
Causes
Hazard

Too Early/too
late, wrong
order

Stopping too
soon/applying
too long

CA-ACS-# 1b:
Providing
INCREASE
THRUST
command is
hazardous if
already at max
speed or when
in close
proximity to
the ISS
[H-1, H-2]

CA-ACS-# 1c:
Providing
INCREASE
THRUST
command too
late is
hazardous if
already at max
speed or when
in close
proximity to the
ISS [ H-1, H-2]

CA-ACS-# 1d:
Providing
INCREASE
THRUST
command too
long is
hazardous if
already at max
speed or when
in close
proximity to
the ISS [ H-1,
H-2]

C. Design Analysis Phase (With a Focus on Causal Scenarios)
In the design phase, steps 1-4, seek to understand why and
how a particular command (or CA) might be issued. This is
done through consideration of the process model description,
PMV, and acceptable PMV values. This allows developers and

security specialists to specify an acceptable range of PMV
values which can be formally modelled and tested as desired.
For example, if the space vehicle’s thrust is the PMV,
acceptable values may range from 10-50 km/s. In order to
comprehensively specify and secure the SoI’s behavior
(functionality) PMVs and their acceptable values need to be
captured for each system’s function and respective CAs.
Lastly, in step 5, we introduce four high-level causal
scenarios. The first scenario is that the Attitude Control thrust
system might apply thrust when it is not required based on
missing, faulty or incomplete feedback. The second scenario is
that the Attitude Control System might receive the proper
feedback information on current speed, but might have an
internal logic error in either interpreting the input data to
determine the actual state or issuing the wrong command based
on the correct state. The third high-level scenario is that the
thruster might issue the incorrect amount of thrust based on
input from the ACS. The fourth scenario involves some type of
component failure (stuck or broken nozzle).
It is important to note that each of the high level scenarios
can be decomposed further as the design continues and
architectural decisions are made. Based on the abbreviated
discussion, designers might decide to include a mechanical
backup to the onboard vehicle autonomy. The early analysis
highlights where the early weight of security engineering effort
should be focused. The system’s positioning and environmental
control functionality have significant impact. At a functional
level (i.e., independent of a particular physical solution),
security and resiliency requirements can be defined for each
hazard. For example, to prevent operator error, additional
engineering considerations should be incorporated into the
desired system, operational procedures, and training programs.
Likewise, the identification of critical information (and
information processing) may necessitate additional redundancy
costs. Note, this is done at a functional level without a specific
architecture. Thus, while this workshop was conducted with a
specific system in mind, the results are generally applicable to
types (or categories) of systems, defense related or not.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This work addresses the gap in systems security engineering
and analysis approaches for the development of secure systems
by suggesting a simple, yet clear means for specifying
measurable and verifiable security design requirements.
Moreover, the suggested approach is tailorable with three levels
of details, all of which provide traceability to the system
owner’s needs. The utility of STPA-Sec systems security
analysis approach is demonstrated with an autonomous resupply
space vehicle example which elevates the security problem from
guarding the SoI against potential attack paths to the higherlevel systems problem of assuring the SoI’s critical functions.
Moreover, this approach makes the security problem readily
understandable and is mapped to standardized systems security
engineering processes as described in ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288 and
NIST 800-160.
In particular, this work seeks to improve the science of
systems security engineering with a focus on understanding and

defining security requirements. Future work includes
completing a detailed study of a next-generation military
refueling system to assess the utility of STPA-Sec for
conceptual analysis of complex military systems to include a
means for eliciting cyber resiliency requirements. Ultimately,
continued research in this field enables more secure and
defensible systems to be fielded.
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ABSTRACT In today’s highly interconnected and technology-reliant environment, cybersecurity is rapidly
growing in importance. Cybersecurity is no longer limited to traditional computer systems and IT networks,
as a number of highly publicized attacks have occurred against complex cyber-physical systems such as
automobiles and airplanes. While numerous vulnerability analysis and architecture analysis approaches are
in use, these approaches are often focused on realized systems with limited solution space. An effective
approach to understand security and resiliency requirements early in the system acquisition cycle is needed.
One such approach, System Theory Process Analysis for Security (STPA-Sec), addresses the cyberphysical security problem from a systems viewpoint at the conceptual level early in the program when the
solution trade-space is largest rather than merely examining components and adding protections in
production and sustainment. This work provides a detailed and independent evaluation of STPA-Sec’s
utility for eliciting, defining, and understanding security and resiliency requirements for advanced cyberphysical systems. This work uniquely offers a complete and thorough example of STPA-Sec by studying a
notional next generation aerial refueling platform, and demonstrates STPA-Sec’s utility to perform
conceptual systems security analysis for United States Department of Defense Major Weapon Systems.
INDEX TERMS Conceptual Analysis, Cybersecurity, Security, Security Engineering, Security
Requirements, STPA-Sec, Systems Engineering, Systems Security Engineering

I. INTRODUCTION

In today’s highly interconnected and technology reliant
environment, systems security is rapidly growing in
importance. As the Internet of Things continues to grow, the
centrality of cyber-physical devices to modern life is
increasingly important. Thus, security (and safety) is now an
emergent property of cyber-physical systems, where their
software and real-time networks require continuous
interaction [1]. The cyber threat is one of the most serious
economic and national security challenges we face as a
nation; America's economic prosperity in the 21st century
depends on cybersecurity [2].
In light of growing cyber threats, the United States
Department of Defense (U. S. DoD) has made recent changes
to expand traditional IT-focused security approaches and
mandate security assessments for major weapon systems
(MWS) [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8]. These policies dictate that
acquisition programs integrate security efforts into existing
systems engineering processes, and work to ensure security
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considerations hold equal footing with other requirements
and design trade-offs at major program reviews. Although,
these DoD mandates are in place, a well-received streamlined
executable approach for MWS cybersecurity analysis is yet
to be defined.
The challenge of cybersecurity is a “wicked problem”
where the problem is twofold: first the problem itself must be
defined. Then the solution or actions required to get from
as-is to to-be must be determined. Specific to security, it is
trying to secure systems via an unknown solution and
defending against an unknown evolving threat. Nested,
interactive complexity and the socio-technical aspects make
cybersecurity a wicked problem [9].
Traditional security approaches are typically conducted
at a component level and the results aggregated together into
a system analysis. This analysis fails to capture emergent
properties of the system that arise from complex interactions.
This research addresses these problems through executing a
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conceptual security analysis in a case study of interest to the
USAF.
This paper has three main goals: First, it provides a
complete and thorough example of STPA-Sec for a
complex aerial refueling system. Second, it offers initial
tips and recommendations for future practitioners. Third it
demonstrates the utility of STPA-Sec for complex MWS
security analysis.
This work presents a background of STPA-Sec in Section
II. Section III provides an introduction to the case study and
presents a tailored STPA-Sec approach. Sections IV-VI
detail the steps and analysis performed for each phase of an
STPA-Sec analysis. First the purpose of the phase will be
introduced, followed by a description of the steps. The case
study example is presented along with rationale to assist a
practitioner in accomplishing an STPA-Sec analysis for their
complex SoI. Section VII provides an assessment of STPASec’s utility, and section VIII provides a brief summary and
conclusion.
II. BACKGROUND

System Theoretic Process Analysis, STPA-Sec, is a
promising methodology for performing secure systems or
security analysis. STPA-Sec applies a systems engineering
approach providing engineers the largest trade space for
developing secure solutions. STPA-Sec elevates the security
problem from guarding the system against all potential attack
paths to the higher-level problem of assuring the system’s
critical functions. Because STPA is a top-down, system
engineering approach to system safety and security, it can be
used early in the system development process to generate
high-level safety and security requirements and constraints.
These high-level requirements can be refined using STPA to
guide the system design process and generate detailed safety
and security requirements for individual components [10].
STPA-Sec is an extension of Nancy Levinson’s systems
safety work: STPA and System Theoretic Accident Model
and Process (STAMP) [11]. This work has been well
received within the safety and systems engineering
community [12]. It is founded on systems theory, analyzing
the system as a whole rather than a sum of the parts to
capture emergent properties common in complex systems. It
asserts safety and security are emergent properties resulting
from relationships among the parts of the system. STAMP
and STPA define the safety problem as a control problem
and leverage control theory to design an effective control
structure that reduces or eliminates adverse events [13].
STPA-Sec is an extension of this methodology from the
safety domain to security and has been shown to effectively
address security through the dissertation work of its founder,
Colonel William Young [14]. STPA-Sec has demonstrated
promise for facilitating early security and resiliency
requirements generation with traceability to stakeholder
prioritized safety and security needs. STPA-Sec has proved
its utility for cybersecurity in the defense industry and the
2

DoD. The DoD has adopted STPA-Sec as Functional
Mission Analysis for Cyber, FMA-C. FMA-C is a version of
STPA-Sec owned by the USAF and has been tailored to meet
the USAF mission need [15]. FMA-C is being taught to
thousands of airmen in an effort to assure critical cyber
systems and reduce vulnerabilities. While the structure and
content of FMA-C is very similar to STPA-Sec, its
application has been tailored to As-Is Information
Technology infrastructure. In practice, USAF Mission
Defense Teams apply FMA-C on fielded cyber systems to
identify mission critical vulnerabilities. The practical
application of FMA-C to IT central systems has scoped its
focus to this mission need. STPA-Sec, specifically in the
tailored approach presented in this paper, enables analysis of
a conceptual MWS prior to a design solution. It elevates the
analysis to highest level employing systems engineering
through systems theory focused on complex interactions in
cyber physical systems.
While John Thomas and Nancy Leveson’s STPA primer
[10] is an excellent resource for instructions on implementing
STPA, its chapter for STPA-Sec has not yet been released.
Of the STPA-Sec analyses completed to date, most are either
simplified for presentation purposes or limited distribution
due to sensitive and proprietary system information. This
work seeks to provide an academic but relevant and complete
example (includes all phases and steps of STPA-Sec) to
promote utility and enable greater understanding for future
practitioners.
III.

TAILORED STPA-SEC APPROACH

This work details a tailored STPA-Sec approach as
performed for a high level case study analysis of a notional
next generation refueling military aircraft, titled the KC-X.
The data used to conduct this case study is sourced from
publically available acquisition documentation prepared by
the United States Air Force, USAF, for the next generation
tanker, KC-X [16] [17] and supplemented by the authors as
required. The documentation is written prior to selecting a
contractor or finalizing a design. It includes the following
information: First, an overview of the operational scope
required with a mapping to joint service requirements is
presented. Next, an overview of the intended mission and
required capabilities is presented. System activities, required
functions, and other needs are listed. Finally draft
performance parameters are presented for evaluation of
materiel solutions. Mission specific details have been
obfuscated and generalized for widest distribution.
A tailored approach of STPA-Sec was first presented in the
authors’ previous work [18]. This approach is composed of
three levels (phases) of analysis: conceptual, architecture, and
design as depicted in figure 1. The overall tailored STPA-Sec
approach begins at the highest level of abstraction with
concept analysis, focused on elaboration of the system
purpose and goal. Next, it descends into architecture analysis
of the system from a functional level. Finally, potential forms
of the system are considered and analyzed in the design
analysis steps. A detailed explanation of each phase and step
VOLUME XX, 2018
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of this approach is presented along with the case study results
and recommendations in sections IV-VI.
STPA-Sec is not intended to be implemented as a checklist
approach; it should be iterative both within each phase and in
progression to lower levels of detail providing verification
and validation. Refinement to previous steps is expected and
encouraged throughout the analysis.

FIGURE 1 TAILORED STPA-SEC OVERVIEW.

IV. CONCEPT ANALYSIS

As shown in Table II, the four conceptually-oriented
STPA-Sec steps begin with mission-level analysis to prevent
the system from entering hazardous system states that could
lead to unacceptable losses and mission failure. Beginning
systems security analysis at the mission-level allows
security engineers to more accurately understand the
stakeholders’ needs and maximizes the engineering trade
space as system goals are transformed into constraints (i.e.,
early safety, security, and resiliency requirements).
TABLE II: STPA-SEC CONCEPT ANALYSIS.
Step
1. Define the SoI’s
purpose and goal

2. Identify unacceptable
losses
3. Identify hazards

4. Develop system
security constraints

3

Description
Capture the mission statement and key activities
of the system:
1) A system to: (What)
2) By Means of: (How)
3) In Order to: (Why)
Define high level, intolerable system outcomes
to key stakeholders (e.g., loss of life, injury,
damage to equipment, reputation, mission, etc.).
Identify system states that when coupled with
worst case conditions lead to an unacceptable
loss.
Develop mission-informed security constraints
that prevent the system from entering hazardous
states. These constraints are synonymous with
early safety, security, and resiliency functional
requirements.

1. Purpose and Goal

The first step of STPA-Sec defines the SoI’s mission in terms
of a purpose and goal from the stakeholders’ perspective.
Stakeholder involvement is extremely important to an
accurate mission statement. For a military environment, the
mission commander is the ideal person to provide this input
with support from his key staff. STPA-Sec’s purpose and
goal is very strategic and the exact word choices dictate
future analysis steps.
The format of the mission statement is standardized into
three parts: 1) A system to 2) by means of 3) in order to. The
purpose and goal for the KC-X example are shown in table
III. The first phrase “A system to” is meant to capture the
primary purpose of the system (i.e., the What) in a few
words. For the KC-X, since input directly from the mission
commander was not available, the authors distilled pages
worth of mission information from other documentation into
a short concise statement, provide worldwide aerial refueling.
This statement was directly captured from the source
documentation ‘mission statement’, but paired down from
the documentation version. It included a specification to
refuel both US and coalition aircraft at the strategic,
operational, and tactical levels. For an STPA-Sec analysis it
is beneficial to capture the core of the mission in as few
words as necessary.
The second portion of the purpose and goal, “by means
of”, identifies the key activities or processes the system uses
to achieve its purpose (i.e., the How). This is often the most
difficult step as the verbs chosen here become the controlled
processes further analyzed in architectural and design
analysis. For the KC-X and complex systems in general,
narrowing down to a small set of verbs to cover the broad
spectrum of key activities is not an easy task. In this case an
OV-5 was available, but its organization did not lead to direct
plug and chug of mission activity summary tasks. The OV-5
grouped activities by ground and air, so it required
reorganization into functional groupings in an effort to roll
up the 20 some functions into 3 high-level activities. STPASec does not specify how many key activities is appropriate,
but it would be difficult to conduct the analysis with 20 key
activities and likely would be very repetitive. Based on a
functional grouping of the activities presented in the OV-5,
the key activities for the KC-X are: Flying, Refueling, and
Mission Planning. These high level, yet simple and practical
functional activities rolled up tasks in the OV-5 such as takeoff, navigate en-route, and participate in MSN networks into
a more useful and paired down set of key activities. There
was some debate over mission planning, but it was included
since this is a security based analysis. Additionally, in the
context of known attack surfaces, we determined the activity
of mission planning, which is highly reliant on computer
systems and data from external sources, should be included
as a key activity for this analysis.
Lastly, the “in order to” identifies the goal, or what
mission the system contributes to (i.e., the Why). Capturing
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the mission the system supports sounds easy but is often
difficult in practice as it is difficult to determine the correct
level of mission the system supports. It can be an easy trap to
say, ‘enables the Air Force mission’, or ‘supports the
warfighter’, but these statements lack appropriate specificity.
For the KC-X, a down select occurred between: fulfilling the
national defense strategy, meeting the quadrennial defense
review, achieving the Joint Capability Areas, and prosecuting
the USAF’s 7 warfighting missions. The decision was made
to combine the most relevant of the above in a coherent goal
focused on the AF mission decomposed into the specific
primary missions enabled through the KC-X system.
Accurately defining the desired system’s purpose and
goal can be challenging. Best results are produced with
involvement from key stakeholders such as mission
owner(s), operators, and users. Moreover, correctly defining
the mission (or business case) provides a baseline for
prioritizing and performing security tradeoffs within an
operationally-focused paradigm.
TABLE III: KC-X PURPOSE AND GOAL.
Purpose

A System to

Provide worldwide aerial refueling

Method

By Means of

Goal

In order to

Flying, Refueling, and Mission Planning
Enable the Air Force Mission to meet
Joint Capability Areas via refueling and
airlift: Force Enable, Force Extend, Force
Multiply

2. Unacceptable Losses

The second step of STPA-Sec identifies unacceptable
losses. An unacceptable loss is a specific, unacceptable
outcome as defined by mission and system owners (i.e., the
key stakeholders). Unacceptable losses should be rolled up
to the highest level. The system losses should identify what
is of utmost value to the stakeholders differentiating from
what is nice to have/desired. Unacceptable losses can be
mission, personnel, or equipment loss; common
unacceptable losses include loss of life and loss of mission
essential equipment. However, losses are not just limited to
these, loss of reputation or loss of critical data are examples
of unacceptable losses that can be addressed through STPASec. To determine unacceptable losses, any outcome that a
stakeholder is concerned about should be identified and
documented. Then those losses can be re-examined and
grouped together or rolled up into the highest level of losses.
Unacceptable Losses
L1:
Death or Human injury
L2:
Damage to or loss of aircraft
L3:
Unable to Complete Primary Mission(s)

For the KC-X example, the losses identified are shown
above. In the author’s review of other STPA work these
were common unacceptable losses shared across other
analyses for complex systems [18]. While an STPA or
STPA-Sec analysis is not limited to these three losses, the
three identified here should be applicable to many complex
4

systems. More specifically, these losses can be generalized
such that they are not aircraft or even military specific with
slight modifications. L1 is broadly applicable and more
generally corresponds to high value asset or operator loss,
L2 more generally is the system of interest (SoI) loss, and
L3 accounts for functional losses. As a note, since this is a
military system, in wartime, L2 may be loosened to allow
for a certain number of airframes or a certain amount of
damage to become acceptable to ensure the mission can be
completed in contended airspace.
Given the importance of unacceptable losses to the
mission system and stakeholders, unacceptable losses
provide critical information to follow on STPA-Sec steps,
resulting in requirements for safety, survivability, and
security that are traced back to prevention of these losses.
3. Hazards

The third step identifies hazards that can contribute to cause
an unacceptable loss. STPA defines a hazard as a system
state (or set of conditions) that together with a worst-case set
of environmental conditions will lead to an unacceptable loss
[10]. Environmental conditions can be events such as
weather but are defined as any condition impacting the
system that is outside of the system boundary (conditions the
system has no control over).
The hazards identified should be within the system
boundary and not themselves an environmental condition or
external actor. A hazard for an aircraft is not a mountain or
weather because the designer of the aircraft has no control
over the weather or the location of a mountain. Instead the
hazard may be the aircraft getting too close to the mountain
or the aircraft being in an area of bad weather. For an STPASec analysis the hazard is written as violation of
altitude/clearance from terrain (H2). The resulting hazard
could be exasperated by many environmental conditions:
weather, turbulence, improper ATC guidance, loss of
navigation, ect. For all these conditions, the hazard as
written is still valid and system design choices can be
selected to mitigate a larger set of potentially unsafe
scenarios (leading to unacceptable losses), thus covering a
broad scope of identified and unidentified environmental
conditions. An example of a design choice informed by this
hazard is purposefully designing a redundant altimeter
system informed by multiple sources of altitude, including
radar. This design choice would likely prevent the collision
with the mountain (unacceptable loss) independent of which
environmental condition put the aircraft on a collision
course.
For the KC-X example, four hazards are identified in
table IV. Specific emphasis was placed on writing them
independent of environmental conditions. Hazards 1 and 2
are written to scope broad groups of likely environmental
challenges the aircraft will encounter (weather, improper
navigation, turbulence, pilot error) into controllable
activities that combined with these worst case environmental
conditions would likely result in a loss. Hazard 3 is included
to capture the hazardous potential of a poorly designed radar
warning or equivalent system in an effort to stress the
importance of design tradeoffs for system survivability.
Hazard 4 could arguably be omitted, but was retained to
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emphasize the importance of reliability and security for
those systems deemed mission critical (i.e. the flight
management system or refueling control subsystem).

H1

TABLE IV: KC-X HAZARDS.
L1
L2
Death
Damage
Hazard to Loss
or
to or loss
Cross Walk Table
Human
of
injury
aircraft
Flying to Close too
other aircraft/out of
X
X
position

L3
Unable to
Complete
Mission(s)
X

H2

Violation of
Altitude/clearance
from terrain

X

X

X

H3

Unable to evade
enemy threats

X

X

X

H4

Msn critical systems
not functional when
required

X

As a general rule, hazards should be abstracted up to the
highest level possible and in most cases the list of hazards
should be fewer than 10. In practice it is often easier to
collect a larger list of hazards and then after review the list
can be combined to group similar hazards and roll up others
to target a list less than 10. Identifying hazards can also
serve to refine and clarify the list of unacceptable losses, as
each hazard should be mapped to one or more unacceptable
losses. Each hazard can map to one or more losses. But, if a
hazard is not mapped to an unacceptable loss then it is either
not a hazard or the list of unacceptable losses is incomplete
[10].
Controlling hazards is STPA-Sec’s conceptual
mechanism for delivering system cybersecurity. The
mechanism is based on Leveson’s STAMP model that
associates the high-level unacceptable losses as arising from
control deficiencies across the system rather than component
failures. The control deficiencies manifest as problems
between components (interactions) rather than simple
mechanical failures. The latter have been the traditional
cause of failures in mechanical systems, but the former
provides much more utility when developing contemporary
large, software-intense systems. Hazardous states are a
necessary precondition to loss. For example, if the
unacceptable loss is two aircraft colliding, then the
associated hazard could be generalized as failing to maintain
safe separation between the aircraft. If safe separation is
maintained, the two aircraft should never collide. The need
for safe separation is identified through STPA-Sec. Ensuring
safe separation is maintained (a control function) throughout
operations is an engineering problem and can be addressed
through systems engineering (secure systems engineering
specifically). There are several different ways the violation
might occur. The air traffic control system might be hacked
or attacked. One or both of the aircraft might be subjected to
a cyber-attack. Likewise, there are any number of
mitigations that can be used to address the hazard. However,
at this conceptual stage of the system engineering process,
the hazardous functionality (safe separation not enforced) is
5

already identified. In other words, loss prevention
functionality (safe separation enforcement) is now identified
and the remainder of the engineering process can focus on
developing a suitable architecture to enforce this
functionality. This approach allows engineers to handle
safety and security in the same manner that all other
emergent system properties are addressed. The systems
approach does not preclude the need for reliable
components. STPA-Sec still identifies scenarios involving
component failure, but it also highlights complex, highly
interactive scenarios involving management decisions,
operations processes and operators. These other factors are
also contributory to many losses. Therefore ensuring safe
and secure operations must go beyond a focus on
technology.
4. Constraints

The fourth step of the concept analysis phase is
developing system security constraints that prevent the SoI
from entering one of the previously identified hazardous
states. These constraints are restrictions placed on the
system (and implemented via the security architecture) to
bound operation within acceptable parameters. These
constraints are the output of the stakeholder inputs for steps
1-3 as the measurable result of the analysis. These
constraints inform early security requirements that are
directly traceable to key mission needs through controlling
the hazard and preventing its associated unacceptable
loss(es). The constraints identified for the KC-X example
are shown in table V.
TABLE V: KC-X CONSTRAINTS.

Constraint

Hazard
Mapped
to

1

A/C must maintain minimum safe separation
distance

H1

2

Must have minimum mission critical safety
systems functional to attempt AR

H1

3

A/C must maintain minimum safe altitude limits

H2

4

Must have minimum mission critical safety
systems functional for terrain flight

H2

5

Must maintain integrity of mission critical
warning and deterrence systems

H3

6

Msn critical systems must be available when
required to perform primary msn

H4

In the same way hazards are mapped to losses, each
constraint should be mapped to one or more hazard.
Conversely each hazard should be mapped to at least one
constraint. If a constraint cannot be created for a given
hazard, it is likely that hazard is outside the system boundary
and thus an environmental condition.
Through our analysis we found most constraints mapped
to a single hazard however some hazards had multiple
constraints. Constraints can be simple statements re-writing
a given hazard in the form of a restriction against operation
in the hazardous condition. KC-X constraints 1, 3, and 6 are
examples of this. Constraints 2 and 4 are written to restrict
activities if mission critical safety systems are not
VOLUME XX, 2018
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operational, and encourage redundancy and robustness of
design for the functions deemed mission critical.
The first four steps of STPA-Sec begin to specify
acceptable and non-acceptable system states which can
eventually be formally tested and verified when the
architecture is developed. At the completion of this
conceptual phase of analysis the list of constraints is high
level and not necessarily security specific, applying more
broadly to safety, security, and resiliency. As the STPA-Sec
analysis is continued into the next phases these can and will
be refined to further specify measurable and verifiable
requirements for safe and secure system operation. The
insights gained through STPA-Sec can also be used to
inform and improve early MBSE efforts. The refined safety
and security focused constraints provide stakeholderfocused traceability for safety, security, and resiliency
requirements which are important for system survivability (a
critical issue in U.S. DoD systems [19]).
V. Architectural Analysis

STPA-Sec architectural analysis is a continuation of the
conceptual phase and examines the SoI at the functional level
(rather than a form specific implementation as is often the
case in cybersecurity analyses). Approaching the analysis
from a functional rather than physical implementation
maintains the largest trade space for potential solutions and
helps ensure the desired system functionality can be
implemented without unnecessary architectural and design
constrictions.
Table VI details the necessary steps to perform STPA-Sec
architectural analysis. The majority of this analysis involves
the creation of a Functional Control Structure (FCS)
representing the SoI. The FCS can be created at various
levels of abstraction such that an entire system is represented
as a single model, as shown in figure 2. Or the FCS can
decomposed into multiple sub-models, figures 4-6, used to
more specifically understand the execution of the SoI’s key
activities. As a reminder, the key activities were defined in
the concept analysis phase step 1 as the verbs composing the
method, or ‘by means of’ section of the SoI purpose and
goal. STPA uses functional decomposition to thoroughly
understand critical relationships between actors and
processes represented as Control Actions (CA). After
producing an FCS, STPA-Sec enumerates all required CAs
followed by an analysis of their criticality, how they
contribute to preventing the SoI from entering hazardous
states. The output of STPA-Sec architectural analysis
identifies potentially hazardous or unsecure CAs for a given
system architecture. These CAs help further refine system
level security requirements given a system architecture.

TABLE VI: STPA-SEC ARCHITECTURE ANALYSIS.
Step
1. Identify Model
Elements

Description
Identify actor(s), controller(s), and controlled
process(es) for the SOI at the desired level of
abstraction.

2. Identify Each
Model Elements
Responsibilities

Capture the description and actions planned to be
taken for the model elements identified.

3. Draw the FCS

Provide a visual functional-level depiction of the
SoI. Depicts the model elements and control
relationships between them.

4. Identify Control
Actions (CA)

Captures (in verb form) the actions necessary for
each element to execute its responsibilities.

5. Complete the
Control Action
Analysis Table

This table systematically enumerates which
hazards are caused by each CA identified in step 4.

1. Model Elements

The first step of this phase begins populating the FCS
with model elements. The FCS model elements include
actors, controllers, actuators, sensors, and controlled
processes. A standard format of an FCS is shown in figure 3.
Starting from the bottom of the model, the controlled
process(es) is(are) the previously identified (Concept
Analysis Step 1) activities the system uses to achieve its
purpose. Beginning with these “How” verb activities, the
primary task in step 1 of STPA-Sec architectural analysis is
identifying the controller and actors responsible for
performing the process. Actors are the operators managing
the process and providing inputs to the system. The
controller is system specific, but often in high level FCS
models is merely represented as a computer. For the KC-X
example the actors are aircrew and the controller is the flight
computer as shown in Figure 2.

FIGURE 2 KC-X TOP LEVEL FUNCTIONAL CONTROL STRUCTURE.
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3. Draw the Functional Control Structure

FIGURE 3 STPA BASIC CONTROL STRUCTURE. FROM [10].

2. Responsibilities

Once model elements are identified, then responsibilities
for the model elements are populated in step 2. This step
captures the actions required of each element for executing
the activity or controlled process. These responsibilities can
be identified from operational or system documentation, and
from particular discussions with users, system SME’s, and
other stakeholders. Once a list of responsibilities is
populated, they are assigned to the appropriate actor for each
controlled process (or action).
This step proved to be particularly challenging for the
KC-X example likely due to the analysis being completed at
the conceptual level. It was difficult to extract
responsibilities from source documentation without
restricting the results to a physical form implementation. In
other words, responsibilities are often generated based on
what that actor or controller did in the previous system.
Most responsibilities listed were merely duty descriptions of
crew members based on previous tanker aircraft operations.
Utilization of these responsibilities would restrict the trade
space of the future system. For the KC-X, the
documentation listed a boom operator as responsible for
accomplishing refueling and more specifically providing
alignment cues for the receiver aircraft. While a valid
responsibility, it assumes the KC-X solution relies on a
human for boom operation and navigation cues. For a next
generation platform, it is just as likely this task of navigation
cues could be automated and performed by a computer
system. In summary, STPA practitioners should exercise
caution when assigning responsibilities that the solution
space is not unnecessarily scoped down from thinking only
how the task is currently executed. Identifying model
element responsibilities is a key prerequisite activity to
defining control actions in step 4 and is often revisited after
the control actions are defined. Additionally, the
documentation parsing effort in search of responsibilities
may inform additional model elements as new actors or
controllers may be discovered.
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The third step organizes the previously identified model
elements into a functional control structure (i.e., a model) by
adding control relationships. Step 1 already populated the
model elements (boxes) for the FCS. Control relationships
(and the FCS as a whole) depict who/what is issuing
commands (controller), who/what is executing the
commands (actuator), and who/what is providing feedback
(sensor). Figure 3 illustrates these basic elements as
previously described in step 1 and shows the basic
relationships between them. At a high level of analysis
organizing and depicting an FCS can seem trivial, but figure
5 depicts the KC-X mission planning example’s more
complex relationships. Often in complex systems multiple
actors can issue commands to the controller, thus additional
relationships need to be modeled. In the KC-X mission
planning activity, both the pilot and an external mission
planning software, i.e. JMPS, have direct inputs to the flight
computer. The flight computer may auto-read a mission plan
from a cartridge or the pilot may manually enter components
of the plan. When decreasing levels of abstraction the FCS
will become much more complex. However, the primary
objective of creating a FCS is to manage the complexity of
the system by accurately depicting key elements and control
relationships.

FIGURE 4 KC-X KEY ACTITIVY: FLY FCS

FIGURE 5 KC-X KEY ACTITIVY: MISSION PLAN FCS.
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level of abstraction was chosen. The mission plan FCS had
many potential tasks under consideration for the control
action. CAs 7 and 8 demonstrate the link between control
actions and responsibilities. Responsibilities identified
through parsing documentation are present in the description
section of the control action list. While not exhaustive of all
potential tasks and responsibilities, it provides a good
description of efforts executed in the Mission Plan FCS. For
this FCS the authors chose to aggregate the list of potential
actions into the CAs: Prepare OPS and Distribute OPS.
TABLE VII: KC-X CONTROL ACTIONS.
Control
Action

1. Position
Mx

Activity

Fly

Performer

Description

Aircrew/
Computer

Adjust position- heading
change, takeoff, land, climb,
descend. Computer included
for autopilot functions

Aircrew/
Computer

Change Velocity- accelerate,
decelerate, climb, descend.
Computer included for
autopilot functions

FIGURE 6 KC-X KEY ACTITIVY: OFFLOAD FUEL FCS.

4. Control Actions (CA)

Step 4 identifies CAs for the system. A CA is a terse
verb (action) statement capturing the execution of a function
(or task) necessary to control the subject process. This step
in conjunction with the CA analysis performed in step 5 is
some of the most important (and challenging) actions
performed in this phase. Populating the list of CAs begins
with pairing down the responsibilities previously identified
in step 2 into terse action statements that an actor or
controller performs to manage the controlled process.
STPA-Sec is not intended to be a linear process. The
nonlinearity of effort is evidenced for the KC-X while trying
to accomplish this step and step 2 (responsibilities). The
primary challenge is determining what level of abstraction is
appropriate for the CAs as CAs exist at many levels of
abstraction. The level of abstraction should be dictated by
the overall level of detail for the analysis.
CAs should be identified for each activity, thus each
FCS. The CA’s identified for the KC-X example are shown
in table VII. This step proved to be the most difficult for the
authors to conduct for this conceptual analysis. Many
potential CA’s were considered, but the authors struggled to
generate them at the highest level of abstraction.
Specifically for the fly key activity, multiple control
actions were considered, quickly highlighting the challenge
of determining the correct level of abstraction. CA1 and
CA2 for example, started from a much larger list of many
activities required to fly (in order of decreasing level of
abstraction): navigate route, change heading, increase bank
angle, maneuver yoke, increase speed, increase throttle
position setting. The list of potentially valid control actions
for the activity fly is extensive. After brainstorming this list,
similar activities were aggregated as much as possible and
the three activities of Position Maintenance, Velocity
Maintenance, and Communicate were chosen to capture the
much larger subset of potential control actions. For an
analysis of a preliminary system design it may be more
appropriate to capture the CAs at a lower level of abstraction
and thus a much longer list, but for this example, the highest
8

2. Velocity
Mx

Fly

3.
Communicate

Fly

Aircrew/
Computer

4. Precontact

Offload
Fuel

Aircrew/
Computer

5. Contact

Offload
Fuel

Aircrew/
Computer

6. Breakaway

Offload
Fuel

7. Prepare
OPS

Mission
Plan

Aircrew/
Computer
Aircrew/
external
mission
planning
system

8. Distribute
OPS

Mission
Plan

Aircrew/
Computer

Radio and digital(i.e.
ACARS, IFF) to other A/C ,
ATC and ground assets.
Access and communicate in
net centric environment.
Instructing both crews on
proper position to begin AR.
Solution independent to
allow for human direction or
computer aided position
information
Receiver connected to begin
refueling. Solution
Independent of human vs.
computer to allow
automation as desired
Command to disengage either
when complete or in case of
emergency. Solution
Independent of human vs.
computer to allow
automation as desired
Reviews mission tasking,
intel, and weather. Interacts
with external mission
planning system to create
mission plan file
Aircrew inserts cartridge into
jet, also provides crew
briefings and coordination for
mission plan. Computer
distributes mission plan files
to A/C systems

Of significance to a conceptual STPA-Sec is the
performer for the CAs. In the KC-X example, specific,
sometimes painful, effort was made to remain as solution
agnostic as possible. KC-X CAs 4-6 provide an example: in
aerial refueling, operators are familiar with precontact,
contact, and breakaway commands as issued by the boom
operator. Since this analysis is for a future solution,
specifying aircrew as the performer would limit the solution
VOLUME XX, 2018
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space. It is feasible for a future computer controlled system
to provide some of these CAs. Or the future KC-X may
implement a hybrid solution with both humans and
computers. As much as possible efforts should be made not
to restrict the trade space of potential solutions with prior
operation biases when conducting a conceptual analysis.
It can be challenging to understand completeness for this
step, but a good indicator of a sufficient CA list is when all
the activities for a given FCS can be completed with the
listed CAs. This becomes evident when executing causal
scenarios (discussed in the design analysis phase step 5). If
the scenario can be executed on the given FCS with the
identified CAs then it’s likely the CAs listed are sufficient.
This again demonstrates that STPA-Sec is truly nonlinear,
and must be iterative.
5. Control Action Analysis Table

The bulk of STPA-Sec architectural analysis results
reside in the fifth step – populating a CA analysis table,
table VIII. This step requires a thorough analysis of each CA
identified in step 4 table VII and enumerates what, if any,
hazardous conditions can be created by the system’s actions.
Each control action is evaluated across four scenarios.
The first scenario asks what happens if the CA is not
provided. In many cases this ends up being a hazardous
scenario. This is the most likely scenario to result in a
hazard as most CAs are designed to be executed for safe,
secure, and efficient system operation. For the KC-X, all but
CA5 identify potential hazards when a CA is not provided.
CA 5s exception is discussed in the following paragraph.
CA 1 and 2 provide an easy example of not providing a CA
causing a hazard. If position maintenance and velocity
maintenance, the two CAs required to execute the flying
functions of the aircraft, are not provided and the aircraft is
in a critical phase of flight where pilot or computer input is
required, a hazardous scenario will result. Since an aircraft
cannot execute its mission without performing the flying
function, it is not surprising that not providing CA’s 1 and 2
could result in H1, H2, and H3.
The second scenario asks what hazards can occur if the
CA is provided. At first this scenario may sound
counterintuitive as one may question why CAs would exist
that are hazardous when performed. KC-X CA 5, Contact,
provides an example of a potential hazard when the CA is
provided. With a combination of unsafe environmental
conditions, most specifically the receiver out of position, it
can be hazardous to execute the contact CA. If the CA is
issued when the refueler or receiver aircraft is out of
position, H1 and a resulting collision would likely occur
resulting in a loss.
The third scenario analyzes the result of a CA provided
too late, too early, or out of sequence. This scenario is
relevant for specifically timed activities where a violation of
that timing or sequence is hazardous. For the KC-X CA 6,
Breakaway, provides an example of this. Breakaway is
issued during refueling when the aircraft enter an unsafe
position. If the breakaway CA is provided too late, the
hazard of flying too close or out of position (H1) is likely to
occur and lead to an unacceptable loss.
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The fourth scenario analyzes if the CA is stopped too
soon or applied too long. KC-X CA3 provides an illustration
of a hazard for this scenario. If communication is stopped
too soon and incomplete a hazard could reasonably occur.
For example, if radio instructions are provided from the
refueler to the receiver to descend and decrease speed, but
communication is clipped before the decrease speed
command is provided, when the maneuver begins, if only 1
aircraft decreases speed the H1 hazard is likely to occur.
This CA analysis table captures a multitude of
potentially hazardous states to aid in further design criteria
to increase the robustness of the system against these failure
modes. This step provides refinement of early security
constraints by informing more specific requirements to
bound the execution of the key activities to prevent
hazardous scenarios and their associated losses. This data
informs an initial “design-to” criteria which is further
developed during STPA-Sec design analysis. However, the
CA analysis table does not incorporate probabilities of
occurrence. Severity is only captured in its identification of
which system hazards are likely to be induced in that
scenario. Further analysis beyond STPA-Sec could be
conducted on the likelihood of the scenarios occurring and
the expected specific consequence to assess the risk level
and criticality of mitigations.
The downside to the high level CA’s identified in Step 4
is they lend themselves to less specific analysis for the CA
Analysis Table. It also produced very similar scenario
impacts that would likely be more diverse with a lower level
set of CAs. The results of this effort accomplished on a
lower level set of CAs may provide more actionable hazard
insights to inform more specific security requirements and
design constraints. However, conclusions are still available
from this higher level CA analysis. For the KC-X example,
the results of the CA analysis table illuminate the
importance of the security and reliability of fly CAs 1-3 as 3
out of 4 scenarios result in hazards H1-H3 and ultimately
unacceptable losses if omitted or executed improperly.
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TABLE VIII: KC-X CONTROL ACTION ANALYSIS TABLE.
CA#

Too Early/too late, wrong
order

Stopping too
soon/applying too long

Not Providing Position MX
is Hazardous if in a critical
phase of flight [H1, H2, H3]

Position MX is Hazardous
if done too early or too late
in a critical phase of flight
[H1, H2, H3]

Position MX is Hazardous
if stopped to soon or
applied to long in a critical
phase of flight [H1, H2,
H3]

Velocity Mx

Not Providing Velocity MX
is Hazardous if in a critical
phase of flight [H1, H2, H3]

Velocity MX is Hazardous
if done too early or too late
in a critical phase of flight
[H1, H2, H3]

Velocity MX is Hazardous
if stopped to soon or
applied to long in a critical
phase of flight [H1, H2,
H3]

Communicate

Not Providing
Communication is Hazardous
if in a critical phase of
flight(takeoff, landing,
joining refueler) [H1, H3]

Communication too late is
Hazardous if in a critical
phase of flight(takeoff,
landing, joining refueler)
[H1, H3]

Communication stopped
too soon (clipped
transmission) is
Hazardous if in a critical
phase of flight [H1, H3]

Precontact

Not Providing Precontact is
Hazardous as a A/C could be
out of position and damage
equipment [H1,H4]

The wrong sequence for
Precontact is Hazardous if
in a critical phase of
refueling setup [H1,H4]

Control Action

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Providing Causes
Hazard

Not Providing CA-1 is
Hazardous if
(CONDITIONS) [(Hazards
associated) H1, ect]

EXAMPLE

1

Not providing causes Hazard

Position Mx
(Aircrew)

Providing Contact is
hazardous if attempted
during an unsafe
position [H1]

Contact

Breakaway

Not providing Breakaway is
hazardous if unsafe position
occurs [H1]

Prepare OPS

Not providing Prepare OPS is
hazardous in almost all
scenarios (no planned route,
no deconflicts, no mission
plan loaded on systems…)
[H1,H2,H3,H4]

Distribute OPS

Not providing Distribute OPS
is hazardous in almost all
scenarios (no filed flight
plan, no crew briefing, no
mission plan loaded on
systems…) [H1,H2,H3,H4]

Providing Contact out of
sequence is hazardous if
attempted during an unsafe
position [H1]
Not providing Breakaway
on time is hazardous if
unsafe position occurs [H1]

Providing Distribute
OPS is hazardous when
malware or
intentionally incorrect
information is
distributed to systems
[H1,H2,H3,H4]

VI. DESIGN ANALYSIS

The STPA-Sec design analysis phase studies the
specifics of a control action using relatively simple process
models and scenarios. These process models enumerate the
decision logic, key variables, and acceptable variable values
associated with each CA in a systematic and straight
forward fashion. Additionally, this analysis identifies which
feedback mechanism is responsible for those process model
variable values (e.g., a sensor or computing mechanism).
STPA-Sec design analysis enables a more thorough
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understanding and specification for CAs which prevent the
SoI from entering potentially hazardous and unsecure states.
The steps of design analysis are captured in table IX.
This phase was not fully elaborated for the KC-X
example. The focus of this effort demonstrates utility to
USAF warfighting systems through illustrating all STPASec steps in a case study example. When conducting a
conceptual analysis as for the KC-X, the high level of
abstraction chosen for CAs does not lend itself to a fully
VOLUME XX, 2018

elaborated design analysis. This section describes and
illustrates the steps of design analysis but does not include
an analysis of each control action.
TABLE IX: STPA-SEC DESIGN ANALYSIS.
Step
1. Develop Process
Model Descriptions
2. Identify Process
Model Variables
(PMV)

Description
Describes the decision logic (“in plain English”)
for executing a given CA.
Process Model Variables are measurable
indicators of the conditions that trigger a CA.

3. Identify PMV Values
4. Identify PMV
Feedback

PMV values are all the possible values a PMV
can be assigned both acceptable and hazardous.
Identifies which sensors provide PMV values to
the actors and controller for decision making.
Brainstorm how a specific implementation of the
system may be compromised. Identifies critical
CAs and validates the thoroughness of the
model, CAs, and constraints.

5. Carry out Causal
Scenarios

1. Process Model

Step 1 of STPA-Sec design analysis develops process
model descriptions. Process model descriptions describe the
decision logic that defines how and when the controller
executes CAs. Each process model should briefly describe
the scenario of interest and focus on when to execute a given
CA with details identifying the specific system elements and
potential responses to CAs. Additionally, the process model
should include assumptions about the controlled process.
During this step, it is advantageous to first generate
process model descriptions for CAs determined as
potentially hazardous from the completed STPA-Sec
architectural analysis (step 5 CA analysis table). This
approach is recommended as a complex system may have a
large (and potentially overwhelming) number of process
model
descriptions.
In
accordance
with
this
recommendation, for the KC-X example an abbreviated set
of CAs was chosen for design analysis to illustrate the steps.
TABLE X: KC-X PROCESS MODEL DESCRIPTIONS.
Control Action

Key Activity

Process Model Description /
Decision Logic

Fly

Execute Position Mx during
critical phases of flight

2. Velocity Mx

Fly

Execute Velocity Mx during
critical phases of flight

6. Breakaway

Refuel

Issue Breakaway when unsafe
position

1. Position Mx

2-4. Process Model Variables, Values, and Feedback

In step 2, Process Model Variables (PMVs) are
described as various conditions which indicate a system
state. For the KC-X example the Breakaway CA, as shown
in table XI, was chosen to illustrate the steps of STPA-Sec
design analysis. Since Breakaway is issued when an unsafe
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position occurs between the refueler and receiver, an
appropriate process model variable is separation distance.
The discrete states a SoI could exist in are then
enumerated in step 3 as PMV values. It is critical these
values are properly understood to specify potentially
hazardous systems states. For the KC-X example with
separation distance as the process model variable, we sought
to establish values that were simple yet enclosed the entire
range of values. Rather than choosing a unit of distance,
whose range could be infinite, we chose constrained values
that informed the action: in bounds, out of bounds, and
unknown. For the KC-X Breakaway CA, this limited set of
distinguishable PMV values is more useful than an
unbounded range of separation distance in feet. These allow
for simpler discrete logic commands to be developed, (in
bounds- do not issue CA, out of bounds- issue CA,
unknown- issue CA).
Step 4 identifies the sensors which are responsible for
generating the PMV values (i.e., data) to include
conventional sensors, personnel, computer systems, etc. For
the KC-X the sensors providing this feedback were an
altimeter warning system, proximity warning system, and
the aircrew visual cues. This step lends insight into which
feedback sensors are critical to monitor for potentially
hazardous states and enforce CAs.
TABLE XI: KC-X FULL PROCESS MODEL DESCRIPTION.
Process
Process
Process
Model
Feedback
CA
Model
Model
Variable
Information
Description
Variables
Values
Altimeter
Issue
In bounds,
warning,
Breakaway
Separation
out of
Breakaway
proximity
when unsafe Distance
bounds,
warning,
position
unknown
eyeball

Steps 1-4 produce a list of preliminary design
considerations to include detailed process models and PMVs
which specify functional logic. This informs subsystem and
component implementation as preliminary design
specifications.
5. Causal Scenarios

Step 5 of STPA-Sec design analysis is the generation of
causal scenarios where the impact of environmental
conditions (previously explored during conceptual analysis)
are examined to more specifically understand and assess
how losses may occur. Akin to tabletop red teaming, causal
scenario generation is typically conducted by system
experts, well-qualified users, and threat analysts with the
goal of identifying plausible scenarios (or conditions
combined with effects outside the system boundary) that
violate or breach a constraint.
Figure 7 presents a tool for provoking thought in
forming causal scenarios for an STPA-Sec analysis.
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FIGURE 7 STPA-SEC CAUSAL SCENARIOS FROM [20].

For the KC-X example, a causal scenario analysis was
generated for the breakaway CA. Breakaway is an excellent
example of a well-designed PMV as regardless of the
environmental condition thought up in a causal scenario, the
system has a robust design to respond. PMV feedback will
indicate in bounds, out of bounds, or unknown. No matter
the external condition, one of these states is valid and will be
indicated. For all scenarios where the feedback assigns a
value of out of bounds or unknown a breakaway will be
issued. This means that turbulence, improper receiver
position, poor refueler maneuvering, engine malfunction,
and any other environmental causal scenarios would still not
break this process model as designed. Even for the unknown
scenarios, ROE's will be in place to attempt to determine the
system state and then if still undetermined, issue the
breakaway command. This specific example of the
breakaway CA was chosen to illustrate a well-designed
process model; often causal scenarios will illustrate the
potential for an undesired impact and require rework of
previous steps to rectify the issue.
In a general sense, this final step serves to provide
verification and validation for the thoroughness of the
STPA-Sec analysis effort. In this way, changes or additional
constraints are often identified as part of the causal scenarios
when attempting to ‘break’ the SoI.
VII. STPA-SEC UTILITY ASSESSMENT

This section presents a subjective assessment of
STPA-Sec’s utility for complex weapon systems. Table XII
provides a summarized assessment for each phase.

VOLUME XX, 2018

TABLE XII: STPA-SEC UTILITY ASSSESSMENT.
Systems Security Oriented STPA-Sec Phases
Concept
Analysis
Determine
Security
Requirements

Architectural
Analysis
Determine
Design-To
Criteria

Easy

Moderate

Novice

Advanced

Expert

Low

High

Moderate

Numerous

Some

Few

Duration

Hours

Days

Weeks

Number of Steps

4 Steps

5 Steps

5 Steps

Purpose
Difficulty
Level of Domain
Expertise Req’d
Level of STPA
Expertise Req’d
Amount of STPA
instructional
materials available

Design
Analysis
Determine
Build-To
Criteria
ModerateHigh

The conceptual analysis phase provides the greatest
return on time investment. This phase is easy to execute
with very little STPA-Sec knowledge. Additionally, the
most amount of STPA instructional material and examples
are available for this effort. We recommend it is best
accomplished in a small working group of key stakeholders.
Establishing an agreed upon purpose and goal along with
unacceptable losses from the key stakeholders is very
powerful for shaping system requirements and enabling
traceability. STPA-Sec concept analysis prevents the
common pitfall of ‘securing the wrong thing’.
STPA-Sec architectural analysis is more challenging and
time consuming than conceptual analysis especially when
12

the system is decomposed to lower functional levels. The
level of abstraction chosen for this analysis highly
influences the time required. The functional control structure
and list of CAs as executed for the KC-X example were kept
at a high level, if these were decomposed to lower levels of
abstraction, the lists of CAs and the CA analysis table could
easily become 5-10 times its current length. While this effort
would require more domain expertise, the additional
information would inform more detailed design-to criteria
while offering the STPA-Sec benefit of traceability to key
mission activities and prevention of unacceptable losses.
While not as clearly articulated in instructional material, the
STPA primer and other slideshow tutorials do adequately
address how to perform this architectural analysis.
However, with the exception of fictionalized educational
examples, the architectural analysis for actual systems is
often proprietary. As such, most real system examples
found do not share this full analysis. These steps often are
the hardest to execute for the STPA-Sec novice, and the lack
of fully detailed real world system examples adds to this
difficulty.
STPA-Sec design analysis is the most detailed phase of
STPA-Sec and can require the most amount of time if each
CA is fully elaborated via process models. The practitioner
will require a much more robust understanding of the SoI as
PMVs, potential PMV values, and the feedback sensors are
often more technical than the previous analysis. However,
this analysis pays dividends in its ability to provide early
design specifications for components. These specifications
are not only presented in clear decision logic, but are
traceable back to key stakeholder mission goals. This phase
was the least detailed for the KC-X example as the authors
had limited system knowledge. However, the proof of
concept was demonstrated and instructions and
recommendations for execution were presented. Very few
of the STPA materials found fully detail this phase of
execution. While the steps are not as complex to execute as
the architectural analysis phase, design analysis requires the
greatest domain expertise along with the most amount of
time investment for completion. Additionally, the detailed
analysis completed in this phase often drives refinements
and changes to previous phases specifically through the
causal scenario exercise.
VIII. CONCLUSION

This work presents a thorough case study example of an
STPA-Sec analysis for a next generation aerial refueling
system. This work contributes a detailed explanation of each
step and practical tips for STPA-Sec’s execution illustrated
through the KC-X example. The primary purpose of this
work is not to present a breakthrough security analysis of the
KC-X, but to provide a consolidated resource to enable the
future practitioner to execute an STPA-Sec for their SoI.
This work contributes a tailored approach of STPA-Sec
to MWS, specifically USAF aircraft. While this tailored
approach is organized into phases and steps for execution, it
is not intended to form a checklist for security. Many
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security methods are executed in this fashion and do not
result in highly secure systems. STPA-Sec encourages an
iterative analysis where steps are expected to drive changes
to previous results in an effort to further refine and specify
security requirements.
STPA-Sec demonstrates utility for eliciting, defining,
and understanding security and resiliency requirements for
advanced cyber-physical systems. Further research could
expand this example to incorporate SME’s from a system
program office to increase the level of detail and evaluate the
specific requirements generated. Additionally, alternate
examples for other services or system types such as space
systems could be analyzed.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
Conclusions of Research
This work is written to advance the specialty discipline of system security
engineering and, specifically targets practitioners within the DoD and supporting
contractors. The first half of this work, presented in the two publications for chapters II
and III provides a readily understandable summary of current cybersecurity architectural
analysis approaches, and introduces a tailored approach of STPA-Sec which
differentiates itself from other approaches in its use of systems engineering to conduct
security analysis at a functional and conceptual level. The second half of this work
presented in chapter IV as a journal paper titled, “Conceptual Systems Security Analysis
with Aerial Refueling Case Study” thoroughly describes conceptual STPA-Sec analysis
through a case study with practical recommendations which enable systems engineers to
conduct conceptual analyses for future complex warfighting systems.
This section provides conclusions of this effort and demonstrates completeness
through summaries of answers to the six research questions addressed in this thesis.
Additionally, the significance of this research is highlighted and recommendations for
future research are presented.
1. What is Cybersecurity Architectural Analysis?
Originally this question was not included as a research question since the
definition was assumed to be available as a part of the literature survey in support of this
work. However, while conducting the literature review, frustratingly absent from
published literature was a description of architecture analysis for security. Definitions of
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system architecture are available; there are very few definitions for architectural analysis,
and none were in context of a security analysis. It became apparent that proposing a
definition of cybersecurity architectural analysis was in fact a research contribution. In
addition to the proposed definition being tailored to the security domain, it more
importantly highlights an emphasis on functional level analysis rather focusing solely on
form common across the few other descriptions available of architectural analysis
activities. Cybersecurity architectural analysis is “the activity of discovering and
evaluating the function and form of a system to facilitate cybersecurity decisions.”
2. What methods exist for conducting Cybersecurity Architectural Analysis?
Chapter II contributes the primary literature review for this work, and presents a
consolidated introduction to complex cyber-physical system architectural analysis
approaches. Chapter II Section III surveys ten approaches relevant for conducting
cybersecurity architectural-level analysis on complex systems. While literature is
available on the approaches surveyed, no seminal work on architecture analysis for cyber,
and none specifically relevant to complex weapon systems, was discovered. Significant
time and effort was invested to explore which approaches are being used in the USAF
and DoD followed by the collection and review of available documentation. This
included attending training courses, conferences, and reviewing published analysis
results.
3. What are the key characteristics for Cybersecurity Architectural Analysis and how do
they map to current approaches for complex cyber-physical systems?
In Chapter II Section IV distinguishing characteristics for cybersecurity
architectural analysis approaches are presented. These characteristics include: bottom-up
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vs top down approach, threat driven analysis, vulnerability based analysis, MBSE
enabled (used an integrated architecture), and if a software tool was required. These
characteristics are determined through detailed literature review, proposal of the
definition, and the review of each approach’s published documentation, instructional
materials, and system examples available. At the end of Section IV, Table I presents a
consolidated mapping of approaches to characteristics as a simplified resource to assist
the security practitioner in understanding the surveyed approaches.
TABLE I: ARCHITECTURAL APPROACHES TO CHARACTERISTICS MAPPING.
Top Bottom Threat Vul.
MBSE
MBSE
Tool
Down Up
Driven Based Integrated Executable Based
DoDAF +
X1
X
X
X4
X
Richards
1
X
X
X
X
X
X
CRAF
UAF
X
X
X
X4
X
Security
X
X
X
ACVAM
X
STPA-Sec X2
X5
X
X
X3
RMF
1. Promotes a top-down approach after mission functions are identified (i.e.,
does not include mission thread analysis).
2. Approach begins at a higher level than other approaches examined (i.e.,
includes mission thread analysis) and includes lower level analysis.
3. Suggests using MBSE, but not required and often not considered.
4. Would require pairing with additional modeling & simulation plugin.
5. RMF is intended to be a top-down approach but is often applied bottom-up
using security control compliance based on system type.

4. How can STPA-Sec be tailored to enable the development of security requirements
and design criteria?
This question is answered first in Chapter III Section V with the description of a
tailored three phase STPA-Sec approach. Of note, this work is not taking credit for the
development of STPA-Sec, as it was developed by Dr. William Young [1], but
re-organizes the steps and separated the overall execution into conceptual, architectural,
and design phases to increase the utility and usability of STPA-Sec and align work with
50

the ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288 Systems Engineering Processes [2]. Chapter III section III
further describes this tailored approach and provides an illustrative graphic in Figure 1,
reproduced here. Sections IV-VI demonstrate this approach for STPA-Sec providing
examples of each step in a thorough KC-X case study.

FIGURE 1 TAILORED STPA-SEC OVERVIEW.

5. How executable is STPA-Sec for USAF warfighting Systems?
This question is answered in Chapter IV through the case study of a next
generation aerial refueling platform, KC-X. Sections IV-VI detail each phase and step of
STPA-Sec as applied to the KC-X case study. Section VII provides an assessment of
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STPA-Sec’s utility specifically in Table XII and its narrative. While certain steps are
identified as challenging, the results of the KC-X case study demonstrate STPA-Sec is
scalable, readily executable, and useful for analysis of USAF warfighting systems.
TABLE XII: STPA-SEC UTILITY ASSSESSMENT.
Systems Security Oriented STPA-Sec Phases
Concept Analysis

Architectural
Analysis

Purpose

Determine Security
Requirements

Determine Design-To Criteria

Difficulty

Easy

Moderate

Determine
Build-To
Criteria
Moderate-High

Level of Domain Expertise Req’d

Novice

Advanced

Expert

Level of STPA Expertise Req’d

Low

High

Moderate

Numerous

Some

Few

Hours

Days

Weeks

4 Steps

5 Steps

5 Steps

Amount of STPA instructional
materials available
Duration
Number of Steps

Design
Analysis

6. What recommendations can be made to increase the utility and ease the use of STPASec?
This question is answered throughout the details of the case study presented in
chapter III. The recommendations presented throughout this work attempt to describe
and detail STPA-Sec to potential practitioners who are largely unfamiliar with the
approach, offering tips and recommendations for its implementation. Recommendations
and specific execution tips for the practitioner are presented in the description of the steps
throughout the KC-X case study. For example, Chapter IV Section V step four provides
recommendations for determining the appropriate level of abstraction for control actions
in a SoI.
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Significance of Research
With the increasing reliance on technology in warfighting systems, specifically
complex aircraft, in conjunction with recent published vulnerabilities of cyber-physical
systems [3], cybersecurity is of critical importance. The security problem is no longer
limited to IT networks; as such, approaches developed for identifying computer network
vulnerabilities have fallen short at securing complex cyber-physical systems against
intelligent adversaries. Cybersecurity analysis approaches are needed to identify potential
vulnerabilities and understand and define security requirements that can be designed to
and formally verified. Moreover, the next major armed conflict is likely to have a
significant cyber component [4].
The need for MWS built to operate in a highly contested cyberspace environment
is understood at the highest levels of U. S. leadership with mandates and funding
appropriated in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2016 Section 1647 [5].
Within the U. S. Air Force, the Cyber Resiliency Office for Weapons Systems (CROWS)
office was specifically stood up to address these larger cyber concerns for both fielded
and new weapons systems through the Air Force Cyber Campaign Plan (CCP). This
thesis directly contributes to the CROWS and CCP by assisting in the training of a cyber
savvy acquisition force, LOA 3.
Lastly, this work provides a widely distributable STPA-Sec case study specific to
a USAF aircraft. Perhaps more importantly, it provides a consolidated and distilled
reference with recommendations to enable practitioners to execute conceptual systems
security analysis.
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Recommendations for Future Research
Future research may continue to expand the detail provided for the KC-X case
study. This work used the case study as an example to support the detailed description of
STPA-Sec, analysis of its utility, and to provide recommendations for the future
practitioner. While the STPA-Sec analysis was largely informed and guided by its
founder, Dr. William Young, and a few other knowledgeable practitioners, it provides a
limited scope of detailed analysis.
Additionally, while key stakeholder inputs should be already incorporated in the
source documentation used for the case study, an ideal STPA-Sec is best executed
through a working group session with the mission commanders and key SMEs. The
absence of this working group does not invalidate the results and certainly does not
detract from the case study’s illustrations of the STPA-Sec process, but it does leave
opportunity for future work. Specific to the KC-X example, the analysis in the
architecture and design phases could be extended further by decomposing the key
activities and control actions into lower, more detailed levels. Additionally, further
process model analysis could be completed along with more causal scenarios.
The final recommendation for future research is working to integrate MBSE into
the cybersecurity architectural analysis efforts. This is an intended area for the UAF to
address, but more research and examples will need to be completed to realize its utility
for complex airborne warfighting systems. This research area is highly recommended for
future students as it could combine the effectiveness of conceptual analysis methods, like
STPA-Sec, with the benefits of integrated architecture and executable models.

54

Bibliography
[1] W. Young and R. Porad, "System-Theoretic Process Analysis for Security (STPASEC): Cyber Security and STPA," 27 March 2017. [Online]. Available:
http://psas. scripts. mit. edu/home/wpcontent/uploads/2017/04/STAMP_2017_STPA_SEC_TUTORIAL_aspresented. pdf. [Accessed 21 January 2018].
[2] ISO/IEC/IEEE, "Systems and software engineering — System life cycle processes,
Third Edition," Geneva, Switzerland, 2015.

[3] S. Checkoway, D. McCoy, B. Kantor, D. Anderson, H. Shacham and S. Savage,
"Comprehensive Experimental Analyses of Automotive Attack Surfaces,"
USENIX Security Symposium, 2011.
[4] P. Singer and A. Friedman, Cybersecurity and Cyberwar, New York: Oxford, 2014.
[5] United States Congress, "Nation Defense Authorization Act 2016 Section 1647," 25
November 2015. [Online]. Available: https://www. congress.
gov/114/plaws/publ92/PLAW-114publ92. pdf. [Accessed 1 June 2017].

55

Form Approved
OMB No. 074-0188
The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching
existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this
burden estimate or any other aspect of the collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington
Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302.
Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to an penalty for failing to comply with a collection of
information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM2. REPORT TYPE
3. DATES COVERED (From – To)
YYYY)
Master’s Thesis
August 2016 – March 2018

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

22-03-2018

TITLE AND SUBTITLE

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

Conceptual Systems Security Analysis Aerial Refueling
Case Study

5b. GRANT NUMBER

6.

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
5d. PROJECT NUMBER

AUTHOR(S)

5e. TASK NUMBER

Span, Martin III, Captain, USAF

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAMES(S) AND ADDRESS(S)

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
REPORT NUMBER

Air Force Institute of Technology
Graduate School of Engineering and Management (AFIT/ENV)
2950 Hobson Way, Building 640
WPAFB OH 45433-7765

AFIT-ENV-MS-18-M-237
10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

Air Force Institute of Technology
Center for Cyberspace Research
2950 Hobson Way, Building 640
WPAFB OH 45433-7765

AFIT/CCR
11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

DISTRUBTION STATEMENT A. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

This material is declared a work of the U. S. Government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States.

14. ABSTRACT

In today’s highly interconnected and technology reliant environment, systems security is rapidly growing in importance to complex
systems such as automobiles, airplanes, and defense-oriented weapon systems. While systems security analysis approaches are critical to
improving the security of these advanced cyber-physical systems-of-systems, such approaches are often poorly understood and applied in
ad hoc fashion. To address these gaps, first a study of key architectural analysis concepts and definitions is provided with an assessment
of their applicability towards complex cyber-physical systems. From this initial work, a definition of cybersecurity architectural analysis
for cyber-physical systems is proposed. Next, the System Theory Theoretic Process Analysis approach for Security (STPA Sec) is tailored
and presented in three phases which support the development of conceptual-level security requirements, applicable design-level criteria,
and architectural-level security specifications.
This work uniquely presents a detailed case study of a conceptual-level systems security analysis of a notional aerial refueling system
based on the tailored STPA-Sec approach. This work is critically important for advancing the science of systems security engineering by
providing a standardized approach for understanding security, safety, and resiliency requirements in complex systems with traceability
and testability.
15. SUBJECT TERMS

Cybersecurity; Systems Security Engineering; STPA-Sec; Security Engineering; Systems Engineering
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
OF:
a.
REPOR
T

b.
ABSTRA
CT

c. THIS
PAGE
U

U

17. LIMITATION
OF
ABSTRACT
UU

18.
NUMBER
OF PAGES
65

19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON

Logan O. Mailloux, Lt. Col, AFIT/ENV
19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code)

(937) 255-6565, ext 3348
(logan. mailloux@afit. edu)

U
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18

56

